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INTRODUCTION
In 1962, Clarence Gideon, a fifty-one-year-old white man who had been in
and out of prison most of his life, won a case in the Supreme Court. Gideon
v. Wainwright famously extended the right to appointed counsel to indigent criminal
defendants in state courts. While Gideon’s Supreme Court victory is well known, it
was not the end of his road.1 After winning a right to an appointed lawyer, Gideon
needed to find one who would take his criminal case. He was referred to a lawyer
with the local ACLU who agreed to represent him alongside an experienced criminal
defense attorney.2 But then, on the eve of trial, Gideon dismissed them, apparently
because he did not trust them.3 He petitioned to be allowed to represent himself, a
request which the trial court denied without noting the irony.4 The trial judge then
allowed him to select his own lawyer.5 He chose Fred W. Turner.6 Gideon was a
challenging client. He was frustrated that even after winning in the Supreme Court,
he still had to face another trial. He prepared piles of mostly meritless motions that
he wanted to file.7 Turner had to work hard to win over his “prickly” client and earn
his trust.8 He visited Gideon frequently in the local detention facility and included
him in developing the pretrial and trial strategy.9 Ultimately, Gideon was acquitted,
illustrating the incomparable value of the right he had just won.
Gideon counts among the most iconic of Supreme Court decisions.10 In
sweeping language, Gideon described lawyers as necessary to level the playing field
between individual defendants and the coercive power of the state—as well as
between wealthy and poor defendants. The “obvious truth,” the Court wrote, was
that “in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him.”11 Any other outcome would be un-American, the Court explained: unlike
other nations, “[f ]rom the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to

1. This account is drawn from ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Vintage Books 1989).
2. Id. at 235–36.
3. Id. at 236–37.
4. Id. at 237.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 238.
8. Id. at 250.
9. See Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v. Wainwright, 33 STETSON
L. REV. 181, 259 (2003).
10. This is true even though, by the time Gideon’s case was heard, the Court had already decided
that appointed counsel was required for poor defendants facing felony charges in federal courts. See
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1983). In addition, almost all states already provided some form
of legal assistance to indigent defendants facing felony charges. See Hope Metcalf & Judith Resnik,
Gideon at Guantánamo: Democratic and Despotic Detention, 122 YALE L.J. 2504, 2518 (2013) [hereinafter
Gideon at Guantánamo].
11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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assure fair trial before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal
before the law.”12
Gideon’s mandate has since been extended to include subsidized counsel for a
first appeal;13 to children in delinquency proceedings;14 and to all defendants facing
the prospect of jail time,15 and even some who do not.16 Nonetheless, its lofty
promise of equal justice has never come close to being realized and today faces new
challenges. In the year Gideon was decided, the United States had around 200,000
prisoners.17 At that time, “a prisoner [like Gideon] could mail a hand-written petition
for the writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court—in pencil—and have someone
read it.”18 Today, that would be impossible. As of 2017, the combined total of state
and federal prisoners in the United States topped two million persons, a 500%
increase over the last forty years.19 Nearly one of every 200 Americans is behind
bars.20 As of 2013, seventeen states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons were
operating at 100% or more of their highest detention capacity.21
The last two decades have also witnessed a tremendous increase in the use of
pretrial detention, both in the United States and globally.22 On any given day in the
United States, around 450,000 people are detained pretrial either due to their
ineligibility for or their inability to pay bail.23 Because of the widespread prevalence

12. Id.
13. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
14. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1967).
15. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
16. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).
17. Abbe Smith, Gideon Was a Prisoner: On Criminal Defense in a Time of Mass Incarceration,
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2013) (citing THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN
U.S. CORRECTIONS: STATE AND FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION, 1925–2010 (2012)).
18. Id. (citing LEWIS, supra note 1, at 35).
19. Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/criminaljustice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/8AME-R3LR] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
20. See Reid Wilson, Prisons in These 17 States Are Now over Capacity, WASH. POST: GOVBEAT,
Sept. 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/20/prisons-in-these17-states-are-filled-over-capacity [https://perma.cc/E5PH-98MH].
21. See id.
22. See generally OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE GLOBAL
OVERUSE OF PRETRIAL DETENTION (2014), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/
default/files/presumption-guilt-09032014.pdf [https://perma.cc/93PS-5JVS] (discussing global
pretrial detention rates).
23. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST? 1 (2017),
http://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey
=4c666992-0b1b-632a-13cb-b4ddc66fadcd&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/G9ZV-TJVT]
[hereinafter HOW MUCH DOES IT COST?]; see also Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Aug. 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150814002053/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/
the-bail-trap.html]. In the federal system, between 1995 and 2010, the percentage of federal defendants
who were detained pretrial increased from 59% to 76%. See THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRETRIAL DETENTION AND MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 1995–2010
(2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdmfdc9510.pdf [https://perma.cc/65PK-AN5F].
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of money bail, incarcerated criminal defendants are more likely to be poor.24 A
recent study found that most people who are unable to pay their bail have incomes
within the bottom third nationally: “[I]n 2015 dollars, people in jail had a median
annual income of $15,109 prior to their incarceration, which is less than half (48%)
of the median for non-incarcerated people of similar ages.”25 In other words, people
in jail “are drastically poorer than their non-incarcerated counterparts.”26 These
factors ensure that Gideon’s promise of equal justice will be realized or thwarted in
this country’s jails and prisons. This aspect of Gideon has gone understudied; most
attention to date has focused on our grievous failure to properly fund Gideon’s
mandate27 and the devastatingly low standard of representation that the Supreme
Court has found to meet constitutional requirements.28
As a result of these trends, the number of people whose Sixth Amendment
rights are now mediated by the state is very high and increasing. When defendants
are detained in jails or prisons pretrial, the state controls every aspect of their
attorney relationships. As the population of incarcerated persons has swelled in
local, state, and federal facilities around the country, the infrastructure supporting
the attorney-client relationship is under increasing stress. The result is an array of
new cases about the challenges of lawyering in jails and prisons. These cases
24. See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE
USING MONEY FOR BAIL 2 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/
documents/bailfail_executive_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9U4-LV3B] [hereinafter BAIL FAIL]
(“From 1992 to 2006, the use of financial release, primarily through commercial bonds, increased
by 32 percent.”). In total, “70 percent of people charged with a felony were assigned money bail in
2006.” Id. In addition, BJS data demonstrates increases in average bails amounts of over $30,000
between 1992 and 2006. Id.
25. BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, DETAINING THE
POOR: HOW MONEY BAIL PERPETUATES AN ENDLESS CYCLE OF POVERTY AND JAIL TIME 2 (2016),
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/DetainingThePoor.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ3C-7DMM].
26. Id. Although detaining a person solely due to his or her inability to pay is unconstitutional,
see Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 674 (1983), the practice is still widespread. In fact, one recent
study of magistrate judges in Philadelphia found that judges are more likely to release wealthy defendants
without requiring money bail. See Aaron Siegel, Inconsistent Justice: The Effect of Defendant Income
and Extraneous Factors on Bail Amount (Mar. 9, 2017) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Harvard College),
http://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFile
Key=8ca9fd5d-7cbb-1a51-6ba9-bdf166463cb4&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/V6KU-FM37]. In
addition, wealthy defendants may be able to pay “for extensive conditions of release” to avoid
incarceration. BAIL FAIL, supra note 24, at 14. Bernie Madoff and Marc Dreier were able to pay for
security, video monitoring, and various other conditions to allow them to remain in their homes
pending trial. See Alan Feuer, Bail Sitters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009.
27. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150 (2013); Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to
Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236 (2013).
28. See Bright & Sanneh, supra note 27, at 2169–70 (“Lawyers have been asleep, intoxicated,
under the influence of drugs, and mentally ill while supposedly defending clients. They have been
unaware in death penalty cases of their client’s intellectual disabilities, brain damage, mental illnesses,
childhood abuse . . . and, in one case, of their client’s real name.”). All of these convictions and
sentences were upheld under the Supreme Court’s standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), which presumes “even in the face of facts to the contrary—that lawyers are competent and
make strategic decisions.” Id. at 2170.
OF
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challenge the lack of private space for legal visits,29 lengthy waiting times for
attorney-client visits;30 remote carceral placements,31 interference with legal mail,32
and monitoring of legal phone calls33 and legal email.34 While the cases tend to focus
on individual types of intrusion by the state (for example, on the opening of legal
mail), read together, they paint a picture of lawyers and clients struggling to create
meaningful and productive relationships through the walls of jails and prisons.35
Despite (or perhaps because of) these mounting challenges, many courts have
become less receptive to Sixth Amendment claims from people behind bars, putting
Gideon’s core principles in jeopardy.36
Gideon won the right to a lawyer. What this meant for him was that he had a
person who worked diligently, both for and with him, to win his trust, prepare his
case, and ultimately secure his freedom. For many jailed clients, and the lawyers who
represent them, this second part of Gideon’s story is no longer possible. This Article
29. See United States v. Roper, 874 F.2d 782, 790 (11th Cir. 1989) (no Sixth Amendment
violation resulting from facility where pre-trial detainee was required to speak loudly through a
telephone and a steel door to communicate with defendant because there was no showing of injury).
30. See Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sixth Amendment violation
based on delays ranging from forty-five minutes to two hours or longer).
31. See United States v. Lucas, 873 F.2d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1989) (no Sixth Amendment
violation resulting from detention in facility 120 miles from his appointed counsel).
32. See Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1997) (no Sixth Amendment claim based
on interference with legal mail because prisoner could not prove actual injury); McCain v. Reno, 98
F. Supp. 2d 5, 7–8 (D.D.C. 2000) (no Sixth Amendment injury due to opening and reading of inmate
correspondence outside his presence due to lack of actual injury); Hunter v. Quinlan, 815 F. Supp. 273,
275–76 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (no Sixth Amendment violation when prison official opened, read, and retained
letter to inmate’s attorney because the letter contained nothing of legal substance).
33. See Brown v. Madison Cty. Ill., No. 3:04-cv-824-MJR, 2008 WL 2625912, at *4
(S.D. Ill. June 27, 2008) (granting inmate one unmonitored weekly telephone call to his attorney against
jail policy of monitoring all telephone calls); United States v. Brooks, 66 M.J. 221, 225 (C.A.A.F. 2008)
(finding no Sixth Amendment harm caused by monitoring of telephone conversations with appointed
counsel because defendant failed to show injury).
34. Stephanie Clifford, Prosecutors Are Reading Emails from Inmates to Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/us-is-reading-inmates-emailsent-to-lawyers.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20170711220637/http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/07/23/nyregion/us-is-reading-inmates-email-sent-to-lawyers.html].
35. A handful of recent news articles also document these challenges. See Nicole Chavez,
Lawsuit: Travis County Jail Inmates Had Calls to Attorneys Recorded, Shared, AUSTIN-AMERICAN
STATESMAN, Apr. 29, 2014, http://www.statesman.com/news/local/lawsuit-travis-county-jailinmates-had-calls-attorneys-recorded-shared/Jlgxf0IiIAE9pd4jL9E1DM/ [https://perma.cc/2P35XKPM] (recording of attorney client phone calls); Rebecca Boucher, Hell Is Trying to Visit My Jailed
Client, MARSHALL PROJECT ( July 28, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/07/
27/hell-is-trying-to-visit-my-jailed-client [https://perma.cc/UE7N-NSE2] (describing the process for
visiting a client incarcerated at Rikers Island facility in New York City). Female lawyers have described
additional problems related to jail security procedures, including invasive searches and the prohibition
of underwire bras. See, e.g., Scott Dolan, Portland Jail Tells Female Attorneys to Remove Detector-Triggering
Bras Before Seeing Clients, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept. 18, 2015, http://www.pressherald.com/
2015/09/18/female-attorneys-forced-to-remove-underwire-bras-before-meeting-with-clients-atportland-jail [https://perma.cc/6M6U-8JSH]; Deborah Becker & Rachel Paiste, Female Lawyers Allege
Improper Searches on Prison Visits, WBUR (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.wbur.org/news/2015/02/27/
woman-lawyers-prison-visits [https://perma.cc/XC79-C3PU] (proposed search at MCI Norfolk facility).
36. See infra Part II.
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traces the hidden ways in which mass incarceration has worked to thwart Gideon’s
promise, both in fact and in law, for incarcerated criminal defendants. It then
proposes possibilities for reinvigorating the Sixth Amendment’s protections,
through intersecting strategies for regulation and structural litigation, with the
ultimate goal of breaking our national reliance on pretrial detention.
Part II tracks the evolution of the courts’ handling of prisoners’ Sixth
Amendment. Gideon both shaped and, in turn, has been shaped by the Court’s
doctrine on lawyering in prison. While Gideon was itself an essential building block
in the Court’s jurisprudence protecting prisoners’ right of access to courts under the
Due Process Clause, it has also been degraded (both doctrinally and practically) as
the courts have retreated from protecting the constitutional rights of prisoners. As
this Part illustrates, many federal courts now analyze the Sixth Amendment claims
of pretrial defendants under a framework developed to balance the constitutional
rights of convicted prisoners against the state’s penological interests, essentially
subsuming this aspect of the law of pretrial detention into the law of punishment.
Part III explores possible strategies for reclaiming Gideon’s promise in
American jails by improving the standards governing attorney-client relationships
and by drawing attention to the deficiencies in jail systems through constitutional
litigation. This Part presents the findings of a fifty-state survey of the jail rules
governing attorney-client visits, mail, and telephone calls. In states in which jails
standards regimes are robust, they represent a vision of the role that jails play in
facilitating the attorney-client relationship against which actual practices may be
evaluated and challenged. And, recognizing that the improvement in jail standards
has often been driven by the threat of litigation, this Part then describes a new legal
strategy for challenging limits on counsel access as a violation of the Sixth
Amendment rights of incarcerated pretrial detainees.
Finally, Part IV concludes by considering the role of counsel access advocacy
in the broader project of criminal justice reform. Sixth Amendment litigation could
helpfully enhance the movement to limit the use of money bail, in particular by
problematizing the outsourcing of detention to rural jails. In addition, by
illuminating the current inconsistencies in their jurisprudence and the systemic
harms that have resulted, access to counsel advocacy could force courts to confront
their legitimation of pretrial punishment.
I. THE PROMISE AND EROSION OF GIDEON IN JAIL
While better known for its iconic status in constitutional criminal procedure,
Gideon was also an important building block in opening jails and prisons to review
of constitutional abuses.37 The ideals of Gideon helped structure claims for
subsidized court access for incarcerated people, which in turn helped open jails and
37.
Gideon can also be understood outside the prison context “as launching a wider
understanding of government provisioning,” resulting in a “‘civil Gideon’ movement . . . calling for the
recognition of rights to state-funded lawyers in cases about health, housing, and family life.” Gideon at
Guantánamo, supra note 10, at 2512–13.
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prisons to greater oversight by courts. Paradoxically, this blurring of the lines
between different kinds of incarcerated claimants and different types of claims has
meant that the Sixth Amendment claims of incarcerated defendants have also, in
some jurisdictions, been frustrated by the Court’s withdrawal from its commitment
to carceral oversight. Given the intersection between poverty and pretrial detention,
the result has been the gradual hollowing out of Gideon’s promise, even for those
defendants who do receive appointed counsel. This Part tracks these doctrinal shifts
and explores their impact on the right to counsel for incarcerated claimants.
A. Gideon’s Role in Building Subsidized Court Access for Prisoners
Until the 1960s, federal courts generally declined to review alleged violations
of state prisoners’ rights,38 citing concerns about “separation of powers; the lack of
judicial expertise in penology; and the fear that intervention by the courts [would]
subvert prison discipline.”39 This so-called “hands-off” doctrine began to erode in
1960s-70s, as the Supreme Court became more engaged in reviewing the
constitutionality of criminal procedure.40 After the Attica riot in 1971, civil rights
organizations began to aggressively and systematically litigate prison
cases.41 ”[F]aced with sometimes uncontested proof of brutal and unhealthful jail
and prison environments not just in isolation cells but throughout facilities, judges
began to find that such conditions also violated the constitutional rights of inmates
and to issue injunctive orders . . . .”42
This breakdown of the “hands off” doctrine was enhanced by the Court’s
developing jurisprudence protecting and expanding prisoners’ rights to court access
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Two decades prior to Gideon, the Supreme
Court struck down a Michigan statute that prevented prisoners from filing legal
documents with the courts unless they were found to be “properly drawn” by the
parole board.43 In ex parte Hull, the Court held that “the State and its officers may
not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus.”44 Over the next several years, the Court decided a series of cases under the
38. See Lorijean Golichowski Oei, Note, The New Standard of Review for Prisoners’ Rights: A
“Turner“ for the Worse?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 393, 399 (1988) (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871)) (“Courts considered prisoners to be ‘“slave[s] of the State,” having “not only
forfeited their liberty, but all their personal rights . . . .”’”); Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge:
Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2000 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM
M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE
COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998)); see also Mark Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due
Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REV. 1 (1978–1979); Notes
and Comments, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of
Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
39. Ronald L. Goldfarb & Linda R. Singer, Redressing Prisoners’ Grievances, 39
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 181 (1970) (citations omitted).
40. See id. at 183.
41. See Schlanger, supra note 38, at 2018.
42. Id. at 2003.
43. See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
44. Id.
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Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses that removed the obstacles preventing
indigent prisoners from accessing the courts. In relatively quick succession, the
Court held that the state must provide transcripts or trial records free of cost to
allow indigent defendants a meaningful appeal,45 that indigent prisoners must be
allowed to file appeals and petitions for habeas corpus without paying docket fees,46
and that the state could not prevent illiterate prisoners from seeking assistance from
“jailhouse lawyers,”47 or limit access to prisoners to members of the bar and licensed
investigators. 48
Then, in the early 1970s, prisoners from several facilities in North Carolina
sued, arguing that they were denied access to the courts in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the state’s failure to provide them
with access to adequate law library facilities. In holding in Bounds v. Smith “that the
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities
to assist in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers,” the Court first
discussed its line of cases removing state-imposed barriers to court access.49 Then,
citing Gideon and its progeny, the Court went on to explain that its “decisions have
consistently required states to shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all
prisoners meaningful access to the courts.”50 It acknowledged the economic
challenges, but concluded that “the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot
justify its total denial” and affirmed that incarcerated prisoners were required to be
given “a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of
constitutional rights to the courts,” with the cost borne by the state.51
Gideon’s core message—that subsidies for lawyers for the poor are “essential
to the legitimacy”52 of our criminal justice system—underpins the Bounds decision.
While noting that “a habeas corpus petition or civil rights complaint need only set
forth facts giving rise to the cause of action,” the Court rejected the State’s argument
that prisoners could successfully raise these claims without access to a law library or

45. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (holding that the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses require that, if states make appellate courts available, they cannot be denied to the
poor based on their inability to pay).
46. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1959) (extending the principles in Griffin v. Illinois to
prevent discrimination against the poor in view of the state’s supreme court).
47. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969). While Johnson primarily concerned habeas
petitions, its holding was then extended to cover assistance in civil claims in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 577–80 (1974).
48. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 420 (1974) (finding an unjustifiable burden on the
right of prisoners’ access to the courts by weighing financial and time costs imposed on attorneys by
travel to remote prisons), overruled in part on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
49. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977). The Supreme Court had previously, in 1971,
affirmed per curiam and without opinion the conclusion of a three-judge district court that a state is
constitutionally required to provide state prisoners with access to the courts in the form of adequate
legal research resources or a sufficient alternative. See Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 15 (1971).
50. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824.
51. Id. at 825; see also Procunier, 416 U.S. at 419–21 (striking down regulation preventing
attorneys from relying on law students and paraprofessionals to interview incarcerated clients).
52. Gideon at Guantánamo, supra note 10, at 2512.

First to Printer_Kalb (Do Not Delete)

2018]

GIDEON INCARCERATED

10/2/2018 1:42 PM

109

other forms of legal assistance and emphasized the importance of “an adversary
presentation”53 to ensure their meaningful consideration. The Court stopped short
of requiring access to counsel for prisoners’ habeas and civil rights claims (instead
encouraging local experimentation),54 but noted that providing counsel as the means
of fulfilling the state’s constitutional obligation would have a number of advantages
in terms of efficiency, accuracy, and prison administration.55
Thus, in Bounds, the Court relied upon Gideon as a building block in creating a
broader right of access to courts for prisoners. The Court did not require the
provision of lawyers to prisoners seeking to vindicate civil rights and habeas claims,
but once again acted to level the playing field between the individual and the state
in the interest of protecting fundamental constitutional values. And, in so doing, it
blurred some of the doctrinal distinctions between incarcerated pretrial criminal
defendants and post-conviction civil litigants and habeas petitioners.56 While, in
Bounds, this strategy worked to break down institutional barriers for all incarcerated
people seeking access to courts, it also meant that the Sixth Amendment rights for
incarcerated pretrial defendants became linked to, and even dependent upon, the
existence of court-access rights for prisoners more generally.
B. The “Turner-ization” of Court Access
When Bounds was decided, the Court speculated that a mere 500 lawyers would
be necessary to provide representation for the entire U.S. prison population.57 By
1987, when the Court decided Turner v. Safley and reshaped the constitutional law
of prisons, this was no longer the case.58 The United States was in the early stages
of a massive expansion of its incarcerated population. The Bureau of Justice
Statistics noted that the total population had “reached a record 581,609,” bringing
“total growth in the prison population since 1980 to nearly 252,000 inmates—an
increase of about 76% in the 7-year period.”59
In Turner, Missouri prisoners challenged two regulations.60 One regulation
limited prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence, except when involving familial
relationships.61 The other prevented prisoners from marrying except with the
permission of the superintendent of prisons, which was to be granted only for
53. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825–26.
54. Id. at 832.
55. Id. at 831–32.
56. The Sixth Amendment is mentioned nowhere in the majority opinion in Bounds. In dissent,
Chief Justice Burger highlighted the way in which the majority elided distinctions between different
types of claimants and claims. He drew the distinction between requiring the states to fund federal
constitutional guarantees, like the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and federal statutory guarantees,
like the right to collateral review of a criminal conviction. Id. at 833–36.
57. See id. at 831–32.
58. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
59. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 1987 (1998),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p87.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUL7-BN9Z].
60. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 81–82.
61. Id.
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“compelling reasons.”62 The district court and the Eighth Circuit applied strict
scrutiny and struck down both provisions.63
The Supreme Court took a different tack. While acknowledging its precedents
requiring “federal courts . . . [to] take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims
of prison inmates,” the Court instead emphasized that “courts are ill equipped to
deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.”64
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor noted that “[r]unning a prison is an
inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the
commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the
legislative and executive branches of government.”65 The realities of prison
administration required a more deferential standard of review. As O’Connor
explained, “Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration.”66 The Court thus concluded that while prisoners retain their
constitutional rights, “a prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional
rights ‘is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”67
Applying its new standard, the Turner Court upheld the ban on correspondence as
“reasonably related to valid corrections goals” that did not “unconstitutionally
abridge the First Amendment rights of prison inmates.”68 By contrast, the Court
found the broad ban on marriage unrelated to the penological interests proffered
by the state, and struck it down as written, while leaving open the possibility of
narrower restrictions on the right to marry.69
Turner wrote a transformation (or “Turner-ization”)70 of the constitutional law
of prisons. A few years later, the Court indicated that its test applied to all
constitutional claims brought by prisoners.71 In Washington v. Harper, the Court
considered a policy that permitted the involuntary use of psychotropic medication;
although the allegation was that the policy violated the Due Process Clause, the
62. Id.
63. Id. at 83.
64. Id. at 84 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 89.
67. Id. (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)). Jones involved a
challenge to prison regulations preventing prisoner meetings and mass mailings for the purpose of
union organizing. Citing its recent case, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), in which the Court upheld
a ban on political meetings at Fort Dix on the grounds that a military base was not a public forum, the
Court concluded that the state needed only a rational basis for its distinctions between the prisoners’
union and other groups like Alcoholics Anonymous. Turner, 482 U.S. at 134.
68. Turner, 482 U.S. at 93.
69. Id. at 97–99.
70. See James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights, 10
N.Y.C. L. REV. 97 (2006).
71. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1991) (“We made it clear that the standard of
review we adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration
implicate constitutional rights.”).
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Court majority explained that “the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies
to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate
constitutional rights.”72
Turner has fundamentally reshaped the way that courts view the constitutional
law of prisons,73 and prisoner court-access claims have not been exempt. This
transformation became apparent in Lewis v. Casey, a 1996 class action challenging
the adequacy of library facilities in Arizona.74 Following a three-month bench trial,
the district court, relying on Bounds, ruled in favor of the prisoners, finding a
number of deficiencies in the Arizona Department of Corrections’ (ADOC) library
system, with a particularly significant impact on prisoners in solitary confinement
and illiterate or non-English speaking prisoners.75 Having found ADOC liable for
violating the Due Process rights of its prisoners, the court appointed a Special
Master who conducted a multi-month investigation and provided a proposed
permanent injunction detailing a variety of reforms, which the court adopted.76 The
Ninth Circuit, in large part, affirmed.77 Applying Turner, the Supreme Court
concluded that the district court’s order was insufficiently deferential to prison
administration, particularly given the security issues involved in providing court
access to “lockdown” prisoners, as well as the intrusiveness and detail of the
injunction plan . . . .”78 In addition, the Lewis majority imposed an actual injury
requirement for prisoners seeking to vindicate court access claims.79 Thus, a
prisoner alleging an access-to-courts violation was required to demonstrate not only
that the legal resources provided were insufficient, but that the state’s deficiency
somehow “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”80 While noting that Bounds
included no such injury requirement, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, argued
that it could not have eliminated this “constitutional prerequisite.”81

72. Washington, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1991); see also Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001)
(“[I]n Turner, we adopted a unitary deferential standard for reviewing prisoners’ constitutional
claims . . . .”).
73. Turner marked a new period in the law of prisons, a return to the “hands off” doctrine after
approximately two decades. See Lisa D. Levinson, Prisoners’ Rights, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1055, 1057–
60 (1998) (describing evolution of the Supreme Court’s prison jurisprudence); Hedieh Nasheri, A Spirit
of Meanness: Courts, Prisons and Prisoners, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1173, 1175–85 (1997).
74. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346–47 (1996).
75. See id. at 347.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 361–62.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 351. Some circuits had already adopted an injury or prejudice requirement prior to
Lewis, relying on Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). See, e.g., Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150,
1156 (6th Cir. 1983). However, the version endorsed by the Court was more stringent. See Hadix
v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400, 404–06 (6th Cir. 1999) (reading Lewis to require a finding of system-wide
injury giving rise to non-frivolous access-to-court claims).
81. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
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Lewis’ impacts were dramatic. In addition to “a marked contraction in the
availability of law libraries and other legal services to prison inmates,”82 the injury
requirement in Lewis created a significant barrier to prisoner court access claims.
C. The Turner-ization of the Sixth Amendment
The Turner-ization of the court access cases has also reshaped how most courts
view Sixth Amendment counsel access claims made by incarcerated defendants.
Since the mid-twentieth century, courts have been tangling with the question of
what kinds of state intrusions into the attorney-client relationship violate the Sixth
Amendment right of access to counsel. The early cases generally made clear that, at
the very least, the right to a lawyer meant counsel loyal to the client’s interests and
free from conflict.83 In 1942, in Glasser v. United States, the Supreme Court granted
a new trial to a defendant whose lawyer had also been appointed to represent his
co-defendant.84 The Court explained:
[T]he assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a
court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent
conflicting interests. If the right to the assistance of counsel means less
than this, a valued constitutional safeguard is substantially impaired.85
These early decisions were equally clear that the right to a lawyer includes the
right to confidential consultation with that person both before and during trial.86 In
1951, the D.C. Circuit considered the case of Judith Coplon, who was tried and
convicted on allegations that she had taken intelligence reports from the
Department of Justice where she worked and passed them to a Russian spy.87 In
arguing for a new trial, Coplon alleged that while wire-tapping her phones, the FBI
had intercepted phone conversations between her and her counsel, both before and
during her trial.88 The district court denied her motion for a new trial, holding
that the FBI’s intrusion on her privacy did not violate the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel unless the evidence gathered was used to convict.89 On appeal, the
D.C. Circuit disagreed, concluding that the jurisprudence “unequivocally
establish[es] the principle that the two Amendments [the Fifth and the Sixth]
guarantee to persons accused of crime the right privately to consult with counsel
both before and during trial. This is a fundamental right that cannot be abridged,
interfered with or impinged upon in any manner.”90 The Court went on to explain
82. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1633 (2003).
83. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (awarding new trial for defendant whose
counsel was appointed to represent his co-defendant at trial).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 70.
86. See Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 757.
89. See id. at 759.
90. Id. at 759.
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that if the client had “on other occasions ample personal consultation with his
lawyer, face to face, which no person overhead . . . [that] fact would not erase the
blot of unconstitutionality from the act of intercepting other consultations.”91
The D.C. Circuit affirmed these principles shortly thereafter in Caldwell v.
U.S.,92 which involved a defendant who was indicted for jury-tampering. While his
case was pending, the prosecution hired an investigator, Bradley, to assist in the
case, who, while operating undercover, became acquainted with Caldwell and his
lawyer.93 Bradley was then hired by the defense to assist in the preparation of their
case, which included a plan to steal Caldwell’s file from the U.S. Attorney’s office.94
The D.C. Circuit found the decision in Coplon controlling, concluding that the
Constitution’s . . . guarantees of . . . due process of law and effective
representation by counsel, lose most of their substance if the Government
can with impunity place a secret agent in a lawyer’s office to inspect the
confidential papers of the defendant and his advisors, to listen to their
conversations, and to participate in their counsels of defense.95
The remedy for violations of these core elements of the attorney-client
relationship was straightforward; not only did challenged practice have to stop, but
the resulting proceeding was tainted and therefore void. In an oft-cited line from
the Glasser case, the Court explained that: “The right to have the assistance of
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.”96
In the years following Glasser, lower courts easily applied these Sixth
Amendment principles across jail walls. They confirmed that incarcerated clients
were entitled to regular meetings with their counsel both before and during trial;97

91. Id.
92. 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
93. See id. at 880.
94. See id.
95. The Supreme Court has taken a somewhat different view when the informant’s information
is not used at trial. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (involving two separate trials). In
Hoffa, a government informant was present during some conversations between the defendant and his
attorneys for the first trial, which resulted in a hung jury. Id. The informant’s testimony was then
separately used to successfully prosecute the same defendant in a trial for jury tampering. Id. The Court
found that while there might have been a Sixth Amendment violation that could have invalidated the
results of the first trial (had the jury not hung), they did not infect the second trial on the jury tampering
charges, given that none of the incriminating statements made by the defendant had occurred in the
presence of his lawyers. Id. at 308. Notably, the Court assumed without deciding that both Coplon and
Caldwell were correctly decided. Id. at 307.
A decade later, relying on Hoffa, the Court held in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977),
that the presence of a government informant in defendant’s conversation with counsel did not violate
the Sixth Amendment when the informant’s attendance at the meeting was requested by the defendant
and the district court found that the informant had not communicated anything about the meetings to
his superiors in law enforcement or to the prosecutors in the case.
96. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
97. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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to have confidential legal conversations and correspondence;98 and to have contact
visits with their counsel with the ability to consult and share documents.99 Then
came Turner and Lewis, and with them a fragmenting of the doctrine governing
prisoners’ right-to-counsel to claims.
Some courts, following Turner and Lewis, have continued to analyze right-tocounsel access claims primarily through the Sixth Amendment lens. In Benjamin
v. Fraser, for example, the Second Circuit discussed the appropriate standard to
apply to jail practices governing defense attorney visits.100 The court rejected the
argument that Lewis governed the case, explaining that while “the right to counsel
and the right of access to the courts are interrelated, since the provision of counsel
can be a means of accessing the courts, . . . the two rights are not the same.”101 The
Second Circuit also expressed doubt that Turner was applicable to cases involving
the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.102 The Turner standard, the court
explained, depends upon an assessment of “penological interests,” or “interests that
relate to the treatment (including punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, etc . . . .)”

98. See Lamar v. Kern, 349 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (concluding that censoring and
withholding prisoner mail to and from courts and attorneys violated the First and Sixth Amendments);
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 766 (D.R.I. 1970).
99. See Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973) (forbidding prisons from limiting
attorney-inmate contact to a visiting room with a soundproof glass barrier, where attorney and
client must communicate by phone and exchange papers through a guard); Goldsby v. Carnes, 365
F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (requiring attorney consultation rooms to be private except for a small
glass panel); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972) (finding city jail conditions allowing
attorney-client conversations to be overhead by staff and other prisoners violated Sixth Amendment);
Case v. Andrews, 603 P.2d 623 (Kan. 1979) (finding jail policy of visually monitoring all attorney-client
consultations violated Sixth Amendment).
In deciding these cases, lower courts often relied on both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,
reflecting the Supreme Court’s blending of these doctrines. For example, in Taylor v. Sterrett, the Fifth
Circuit, in considering a challenge to a jail mail policy, found it “unnecessary to consider separately the
Sixth Amendment rights of the prisoner-plaintiffs.” 532 F.2d 461, 472 (5th Cir. 1976). Any infringement
of the right to effective counsel by the reading of an inmate’s correspondence with an attorney is
included within a concurrent abridgement of the right of access to the courts. Id. at 473.
100. 264 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2001).
101. See Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 185 (2d Cir. 2001). As the court noted in rejecting
the addition of a prejudice requirement, this kind of harm is very hard to demonstrate in the context of
a Sixth Amendment claim:
It is not clear to us what “actual injury” would even mean as applied to a pretrial detainee’s
right to counsel. Lewis describes “actual injury” as a showing that a “non-frivolous legal
claim had been frustrated or was being impeded” due to the action of prison officials. The
reason pretrial detainees need access to the courts and counsel is not to present claims to
the courts, but to defend against the charges brought against them.
Id. at 186. Interestingly, in the absence of any relevant Sixth Amendment precedent from the Supreme
Court, the Second Circuit relied on Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), which struck down a
regulation preventing attorneys from relying on law students and paraprofessionals to interview
incarcerated clients. The court noted that Procunier was also a court access case, but reasoned that its
more protective standard was applicable because of its factual similarities. Id. at 187.
102. Id. at 187.
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which are “arguably not an appropriate guide for the pretrial detention of accused
persons.”103
While not anomalous,104 the Second Circuit’s approach has been rejected by
many other courts which, following Turner and Lewis, evaluate the Sixth Amendment
claims of pretrial defendants as part of the broad (and less clearly grounded) 105 right
of access to courts. Picking up on the tone and reasoning of Turner and Lewis, courts
in these cases demonstrate more concern about the challenges of modern prison
administration, and show an increasing willingness to overlook a growing number
of so-called “harmless” intrusions on the right to counsel.106 They are reluctant to
punish occasional (or even regular) mistakes occurring in the prison bureaucracy.107
And they recognize the potential for lawyer criminality and misconduct (quite a
departure from Gideon’s portrayal of the lawyer as champion on behalf of the poor
and marginalized).108 Finally, in line with the Court’s instruction in Lewis, courts are
103. Id. at 187 n.10; see also Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.2, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (arguing that Turner is inappropriate for cases involving pretrial
detainees).
104. See, e.g., Covino v. Vt. Dept. of Corrs., 933 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1991) (vacating and remanding
on the grounds that district court should have considered whether transfer to a facility 56 miles away
unconstitutionally impaired his right to counsel); Carr v. Tousley, No. CV-06-0125SJLQ, 2009 WL
1514661, at *33 (D. Idaho May 27, 2009) (“In challenging regulations which adversely affect the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by impeding attorney visitation, a pretrial detainee is not required to
demonstrate actual injury.”); Lynch v. Leis, No. 1:00-CV-274 SJD, 2002 WL 33001391 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 19, 2002) (unpublished) (striking down restrictive collect-call policy as violation of the Sixth
Amendment).
105. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 366 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that “the
majority opinion in Bounds failed to identify a single provision of the Constitution to support the right
created in that case . . . .”).
106. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 584–85 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When the government
deliberately interferes with the confidential relationship between a criminal defendant and defense
counsel, that interference violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if it substantially prejudices
the criminal defendant.”); Ervin v. Busby, 992 F.2d 147, 150 (8th Cir. 1993) (evidence of actual prejudice
necessary to maintain a claim based on interference with right to counsel); Fleury v. Collins, No. 10-cv01361-LTB-KLM, 2011 WL 1706835, at *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2011) (unpublished) (dismissing
prisoner’s Sixth Amendment claims because he “provided absolutely no explanation of how the alleged
supervision and monitoring of his telephone calls to counsel ‘compromised [his] defense.’”) (alterations
in original); Horacek v. Seaman, No. 08-10866, 2009 WL 2928546, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2009)
(“[T]o establish a Sixth Amendment violation by defendants’ alleged monitoring of his telephone calls
to his attorney, plaintiff must show that monitoring prejudiced his defense of the criminal charges
against him.”); Carr, 2009 WL 1514661, at *33 (“Since Plaintiff has not alleged how he was prejudiced
as a result of the alleged monitoring of telephone calls . . . [he] has not stated a constitutional
violation.”); Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Minn. 2005) (“Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment
claim fails for essentially the same reason: failure to show prejudice from any interference with his
mail.”); United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (no Sixth Amendment violation
when prisoner’s attorney phone calls were monitored and contents were communicated to the
prosecution because the communications were not prejudicial).
107. See Lewis v. Cook Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 6 Fed. Appx. 428, 430 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding no
Sixth Amendment violation when prisoner alleged that his communications with counsel were chilled
by the repeated opening of his legal mail); Thomsen, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 961 (finding that the improper
opening of three letters caused no loss of counsel’s assistance).
108. See, e.g., Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 2017) (allowing scanning (but
not reading) of legal mail “to confirm that it does not include suspicious features such as maps [of the
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very reluctant to impose particular modes or methods of communication as a
constitutional matter. Some explicitly conclude that no confidentiality in one form
of communication (particularly phone and email) is required because alternative
confidential forms of communication (postal mail and in-person visits) are
presumed to be available, even if logistically challenging and time-consuming.109
D. The Cause and Effect of “Turner-ization”
The use of the Turner standard in access to counsel cases likely reflects some
justifiable confusion about the Supreme Court’s doctrine. More significantly,
however, it reflects the real challenge of making process rights meaningful in a
context where the use of incarceration is disconnected from the determination of
guilt and innocence.
As an initial matter, the Court’s own use of the Turner standard has been
inconsistent.110 Although the Court indicated in Washington v. Harper111 that the
Turner standard applies to all constitutional claims brought by prisoners,112 more
recently, in Johnson v. California, the Court limited its use “only to rights are
‘inconsistent with proper incarceration.’”113 Writing for the majority in Johnson,
Justice O’Connor posited that cases involving “claims of cruel and unusual
punishment and racial segregation fell outside the new standard because they were
prison], and making sure that illegal goods or items that pose a security threat are not hidden in the
envelope.”). But see Mann v. Reynolds, 46 F.3d 1055 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that prison policy
prohibiting contact visits between attorneys and their clients implicated the Sixth Amendment because
prison offered no explanation “for singling out attorneys for restricted contact.”).
109. See, e.g., Aswegan v. Henry, 981 F.2d 313, 314 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Although prisoners have a
constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts, prisoners do not have a right to any particular
means of access, including unlimited telephone calls.”); Stamper v. Campbell Cty., No. 2007-49 (WOB),
2009 WL 2242410 (E.D. Ky. July 24, 2009) (finding no violation of the Sixth Amendment when
telephone privileges were revoked for five days); Saunders v. Dickerson, No. 1:07cv1094 (LMB/BRP),
2008 WL 2543428, at *4 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008) (pretrial detainee whose telephone privileges were
suspended while he was in administrative segregation failed to state a viable Sixth Amendment claim
because he could have written or had in-person visits with the attorney, and because he failed to show
prejudice), aff’d, 313 Fed. Appx. 665 (4th Cir. 2009); Woods v. St. Louis Justice Ctr., No. 4:06-CV-233
CAS, 2007 WL 2409753, at *10–11 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 20, 2007) (granting summary judgement on Sixth
Amendment claim based on limited phone access to attorney where other means of communication
were available); Barr v. Levi, No. 06-4683, 2007 WL 1410900, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2007)
(dismissing complaint of inmate who alleged that revocation of his telephone privileges violated his
right to counsel when plaintiff could write or receive in person visits); Cesal v. Bureau of Prisons,
No. 04-CV-281-DLB, 2006 WL 2803057, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2006) (rejecting claim by prisoner
whose legal calls were limited and monitored because “reasonable limitations on the number and length
of such phone calls do not establish a constitutional violation where the prisoner has other perfectly
adequate means of communication.”).
110. See generally Trevor N. McFadden, Note, When to Turn to Turner? The Supreme Court’s
Schizophrenic Prison Jurisprudence, 22 J.L. & POL. 135, 136–37 (2006) (noting that despite its professed
commitment to Turner, the Court has only irregularly applied its test to procedural due process cases
and has never applied it to Fifth or Eighth Amendment cases).
111. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1991).
112. See id.
113. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 500 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539
U.S. 126, 131 (2003)).
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incompatible with ‘public respect for our system of justice.’”114 Applying Johnson,
then the counsel access claims of pretrial detainees should fall outside Turner. The
motivating concern of Gideon was that without the help of a lawyer, poor defendants
would be wrongfully convicted and punished. Thus, under Gideon’s logic, lawyer
access is essential to ensuring to the reliable determination of innocence and guilt
and therefore to the legitimacy of our justice system.
It’s unlikely, however, that this ambiguity in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence completely accounts for the inconsistent treatment of counsel access
claims by the lower federal courts. The challenge they confront is more profound.
As the Second Circuit pointed out in Benjamin, Turner justified abridging the rights
of prisoners by pointing to the state’s countervailing penological interests, interests
which do not exist with respect to pretrial detainees. Yet as the use of pretrial
detention has skyrocketed, creating a large and growing population of legally
innocent people in jail, lower courts have increasingly been asked to balance the
basic constitutional rights of the detained against the pressing demands of
correctional administration. While some courts have continued to enforce the
distinction between the pretrial and the convicted, most courts, in applying Turner,
have chosen to make the availability of rights dependent on carceral status, thereby
privileging the practical challenges of managing the logistics of mass incarceration
over the normative concerns of justice. In doing so, these courts implicitly
acknowledge the diminished value of procedural protections like those Gideon
guarantees for people whose punishment began long before adjudication, and for
whom incarceration is more about their poverty or race than their guilt.115 In short,
the courts’ misplaced reliance on Turner in these cases reflects their struggle to
manage the disconnect between the justice system as conceived of in the law of
criminal procedure, and in practice.
Turner-ization has significantly hindered the ability of incarcerated defendants
to successfully assert their Sixth Amendment rights. Without the ability to consult
regularly, to speak privately, to sit together in the same room, to review and to
discuss documents together, the right to counsel is hollow. And when access
challenges impede lawyers in their work, adding additional wasted hours for each
visit, lawyers must increasingly ration their time between clients, undermining the
constitutional guarantee of counsel free from conflict.116
114.
115.

Robertson, supra note 70, at 107.
See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text; see also DAVID ARNOLD, WILL DOBBIE &
CRYSTAL S. YANG, RACIAL BIAS IN BAIL DECISIONS 2 (2018), https://www.princeton.edu/
~wdobbie/files/racialbias.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TGZ-WE7B] (finding that in Miami and
Philadelphia, black defendants are 3.6 percent more likely to be assigned monetary bail than white
defendants and receive bail amounts that are over $9000 greater); P.R. Lockhard, “A MultibillionDollar Toll”: How Cash Bail Hits Poor People of Color the Hardest, VOX (Dec. 6, 2017, 1:20
PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/12/6/16739622/ucla-report-bail-low-income-race
[https://perma.cc/K3S7-82X9] (documenting racial disparities in bail amounts charged in Los
Angeles).
116. Moreover, because most courts following Bounds have held that appointing a lawyer meets
the state’s constitutional burden to provide access to courts, the existence of a lawyer, no matter how
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The impact of this chipping away at the Sixth Amendment is hard to measure
in individual cases—it can be challenging to prove how more regular visits, easier
communication, and improved trust between the client and the lawyer play into the
disposition of a particular case. The Lewis injury requirement has consequently
proven to be an insurmountable burden in many recent cases alleging Sixth
Amendment violations.117 The results of the denial of access are much easier to see
in the aggregate. Detained defendants are far more likely to end up convicted and
incarcerated due in part to “the substantial difficulty faced by a pretrial detainee
attempting to mount a successful defense from a jail cell.”118 A study of over
150,000 defendants booked into a Kentucky jail over a one-year period found that
defendants “who are detained for the entire pretrial period are much more likely to
be sentenced to jail and prison”119 and to “longer jail and prison sentences”120 with
the most significant effects “for low-risk defendants.”121 Additionally, faced with
high defense burdens, jailed defendants “often accept plea bargains in lieu of
persevering through trial.”122 Of course, lack of access to counsel is only one factor
in these outcomes, but it is one of the ways in which overreliance on detention
perpetuates itself.
The ideals of Gideon helped build up a subsidized commitment to court access
for incarcerated people claiming violations of their fundamental constitutional
rights. Tragically, however, as our jail and prison populations have expanded and
the Court has slowly backed away, once again, from enforcing the constitutional
rights of prisoners, the Court’s decision not to draw clear distinctions between right
to counsel and prisoner court access claim has led to an erosion in the Sixth
Amendment. Given the well-established overlap between poverty and pretrial

limited a prisoner’s contact with her, invalidates all other possible claims to legal resources. See, e.g.,
Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W ]e confirm that the appointment of counsel
can be a valid means of satisfying a prisoner’s right of access to the courts.”); United States v. Smith,
907 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “the state does not have to provide access to a law library
to defendants in criminal trials who wish to represent themselves” and waive their right to counsel);
Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1042 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he provision of lawyers is one means by
which a state may provide prisoners with meaningful access to courts.”); Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d
639, 643 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he trial court’s offer of appointment of counsel . . . , and the appointment
of standby counsel, satisfied any obligation which the state had to provide [the detainee] with legal
assistance.”). Thus, the Bounds Court’s opinion, which could reasonably be read as urging the states to
expand access to subsidized counsel for prisoners’ claims, has now, in some instances, become a
mechanism for denying legal resources to criminal defendants whose lawyers are ineffective or just
unavailable.
117. See supra note 106 (listing cases).
118. Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344,
1355 (2013).
119. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER,
INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 4 (2013),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_
FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7W4-D6P4].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Wiseman, supra note 118, at 1355.
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detention, the result is another undoing of Gideon’s promise, even for those
defendants who do receive appointed counsel. Simply put, there is now, in many
jurisdictions, a different Sixth Amendment for incarcerated people.
II. RENEWING GIDEON’S PROMISE IN JAILS AND PRISONS
The previous Part illustrated how the Turner-ization of counsel access claims
has undermined the Sixth Amendment claims of incarcerated defendants. This Part
explore two possible avenues for reconstituting them, through improved jail
standards and through constitutional litigation challenging the denial of counsel
access in jails. Increasingly, jail facilities do not house only or all pretrial prisoners;
nor is the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel limited to pretrial
detainees.123 Nonetheless, in most states, jails are still the institutions where the
Sixth Amendment’s protections are likely to be realized or thwarted. Thus, a
renewed focus on improving standard protections for the attorney-client
relationship in jails could help to draw attention to the challenges raised by
overreliance on pretrial detention and build a mandate for resolving them.
Moreover, because the populations in many jail and prison facilities include both
people who have a constitutionally protected right to counsel and those who do
not, advocacy to improve lawyer access could ultimately prove beneficial even to
prisoners who would not have their own constitutional claims. As Gideon helped to
pave the way to broader court access claims by prisoners, a renewed focus on the
denial of Sixth Amendment rights could begin to open up court access to prisoners
more generally.
A. The Regulatory Framework and Potential Avenues for Reform
While the case law no longer offers clear guidance, a robust right to counsel is
still visible in some states’ jail standards. To gain a window into the landscape of
standards governing the Sixth Amendment rights, we conducted a survey of
electronically available state jail rules governing three significant elements of the
attorney-client relationship: visits, phone calls, and mail.124
1. Methodology
One of the challenges inherent in ensuring the Sixth Amendment rights of
incarcerated people is the decentralized nature of jail organization. Historically, jails
in most states were run on an ad hoc basis by local sheriffs’ departments, as an

123. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s jurisprudence
expanding the right to counsel).
124. I am tremendously grateful to Leila Abu-Orf, Amber Frey, and particularly to Janet
Kearney for their able assistance in designing and conducting this survey. The complete results of the
survey are available at Gideon Incarcerated: Access to Counsel in Pretrial Detention, LOY. U. NEW
ORLEANS, http://law.loyno.edu/library/gideon-incarcerated-access-counsel-pretrial-detention
[https://perma.cc/8NFW-DJDF] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).

First to Printer_Kalb (Do Not Delete)

120

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/2/2018 1:42 PM

[ Vol. 9:101

ancillary function to law enforcement.125 Then, beginning in the 1970s, as jail
conditions became the subject of litigation as part of the broader rejection of the
hands-off doctrine,126 some states began to adopt different forms of state standards
governing jail operations.127
While this process is patchwork and incomplete, some two-thirds of states
(not including the six “unitary” systems)128 have now adopted some form of
statewide standards governing their local jails, although not all of these standards
are enforceable or measured through regular oversight.129 Initially, the impetus for
these standards came primarily from outside the correctional system, from advocacy
groups, media investigations, and successful litigation.130 Eventually, however, as
the pressures for change began to build, some within the corrections community
began to see the standards process as a mechanism for avoiding costly litigation and
for drawing increased public attention and financial support. Thus, most states have
considered adopting prison standards, even if they have thus far failed to implement
them.131
We began by identifying the states that have adopted statewide jails standards,
a task complicated by the lack of uniformity in jail administrative structures from
state to state.132 We located thirty-four states where jail control is localized, but
subject to some form of statewide standards, whether mandatory or voluntary.133

125. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, JAILS:
INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF A LOCAL PROBLEM 3–4 (1984) (describing the historical
origins of American jails).
126. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
127. See Joel A. Thompson & G. Larry Mays, State-Local Relations and the American Jail Crisis:
An Assessment of State Jail Mandates, 7 POL. STUD. REV. 567, 567–68 (1988).
128. Unitary states are those in which jail functions are an integrated part of the state corrections
system. Id. at 569. These states include Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawai’i, Rhode Island, and
Vermont.
129. See MARK D. MARTIN, JAIL STANDARDS AND INSPECTIONS PROGRAMS: RESOURCE AND
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 45 (2007) (cataloguing mandatory standards and inspection programs). For
an extensive overview of the corrections oversight mechanisms, see Michele Deitch, Independent
Correctional Oversight Mechanisms Across the United States: A 50-State Inventory, 30 PACE L. REV. 1754
(2010).
130. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 125, at 97.
131. A survey conducted of jail administrators in Arizona found that: “Many of the jailers
interviewed anticipated statutory minimum standards as a welcome support in obtaining desperately
needed improvements that have been forestalled by low priority funding and public indifference in their
local jurisdictions.” Patricia A. Metzger, Cry for Standards: Report on Living Condition and Facilities in
Arizona’s Local Jails and Prisons, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 251, 396; see also NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MAINE
JAILS: PROGRESS THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS 6 (1987) (noting that standards can help to ensure
consistent operations and defend against liability).
132. The last comprehensive survey we were able to locate was conducted by the National
Institute of Corrections in 2007. See MARTIN, supra note 129. Our data indicates that there has been an
increase in the number of states with jail standards over the last decade.
133. Alabama; Arkansas; California; Florida; Georgia; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kentucky;
Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michigan; Minnesota; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; New
Jersey; New York; North Carolina; North Dakota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; South
Carolina; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Virginia; West Virginia; and Wisconsin.
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The six unitary states all have standards that govern their facilities, including those
that hold pretrial detainees.134 Ten states lack any form of statewide standards.135
Standards, where they exist, are generally codified in four places (in some
states, they appear in more than one):136 statute; regulation; in statewide policies
developed by the state correctional system or some other kind of statewide
commission or association; and facility-specific rules and procedures. We focused
our attention on statewide regulations and policies, as those rules are the most
detailed, accessible, and amenable to reform efforts.
We then conducted searches of the administrative regulations available on
Westlaw and on the websites of the states’ departments of corrections and other
rule-making bodies. From those searches, we were generally able to locate the
statewide rules or identify their source. In some instances, we were able to determine
that statewide policies existed, but were not publicly available.137
2. Findings
Our survey indicated that of the thirty-eight states with some form of
electronically available statewide standards, all but two (Michigan and Alabama138)
have at least some rules governing counsel access in their jails. In addition, one state,
Colorado, which does not have statewide jail standards, has some limited statutory
protections for counsel access.139 There is significant variation among the states,
Some states have more than one level of jail standards for different forms of jails. For example,
in Kentucky, jails that house state prisoners are subject to different standards than jails that do
not. Other states have different standards for different parts of the jail system. For example, in New
York, the Department of Corrections oversees state prisons, the New York City Department of
Corrections oversees prisons and jails in New York City, and county jails are under local control.
134. Alaska; Connecticut; Delaware; Hawai’i; Rhode Island; and Vermont.
135. Arizona; Colorado; Kansas; Mississippi; New Hampshire; New Mexico; Nevada; South
Dakota; Washington; and Wyoming.
136. In these cases, we chose to report the most detailed set of rules.
137. For example, the Utah Sheriffs Association conducts voluntary inspections, but their
standards are not electronically available to the public. Nor are the standards promulgated by the
Montana Sheriffs and Peace Officer Jail Standards Task Force. Montana has repeatedly considered
adopting mandatory standards. See DAVID S. NISS, MEMO TO THE LAW AND JUSTICE INTERIM
COMMITTEE RE: NO. 3 - JAIL STANDARDS ( 2008), http://leg.mt.gov/content/committees/
interim/2007_2008/law_justice/meeting_documents/LJIC%20JAIL%20STANDARDS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5GU-ZNXV ]. Georgia has two sets of standards, only one of which is available
to the public.
This overview is incomplete. Without canvassing the policymaking bodies in every state, which
was beyond the scope of this project, we cannot be certain that the picture of each state’s rules that
emerges from electronically available policies is complete. Our goal, however, was to represent the
standards that are easily accessible to jail administrators, staff, advocates, and the public.
138. In addition to the state’s statutory protections, we found references to Alabama LegalBased Jail Guidelines, but were not able to locate the guidelines themselves.
139. Colorado law provides:
Any person committed, imprisoned, or arrested for any cause, whether or not such person
is charged with an offense, shall be allowed to consult with an attorney-at-law of this state
whom such person desires to see or consult, alone and in private at the place of custody, as
many times and for such period each time as is reasonable . . .
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both in terms of the substance of their protections as well as in the level of
specificity at which they operate. The states can be characterized as having
standards that are minimal, general, or detailed, although the groupings are inexact
and states that have detailed standards in one area may be lacking specificity in
others. Furthermore, although greater detail is not necessarily associated with
increased rights protections, it is at least possible that providing more specific
guidance on implementation helps to promote compliance.
Minimal-standard states require only that jail administrators develop and
publicize written policies. California, for example, requires the “facility
administrator [to] develop written policies and procedures to ensure inmates have
access to the court and to legal counsel. Such access shall consist of: (a) unlimited
mail . . . and, (b) confidential communications with attorneys.”140 Other minimal
standard states include Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, South
Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
General-standard states go beyond requiring the existence of policies to
establishing basic minimal requirements for attorney access. Idaho, for example,
requires that attorneys are allowed to visit inmates “at reasonable hours other than
during regularly scheduled visiting hours,”141 and that incoming correspondence
from counsel “may be opened only to inspect for contraband” in the presence of
the prisoners, “but . . . not read.”142 General-standard states include Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
and Virginia.
Finally, there are a handful of states, including several of the unitary states,
with detailed standards governing attorney access. Nebraska’s standards on attorney
visiting, for example, provide that attorneys and their assistants shall be able to meet
with their clients “at any reasonable time, for any reasonable length of time,” and
that “in the event of an emergency, then attorneys or their legal assistants shall be
allowed to visit their clients at any time.”143 Unless requested by counsel or
the client, “all attorney-client visits shall be contact visits.” These visits “shall
be in a private area . . . so as to allow for confidential communication among
up to four [4] people with adequate writing space.”144 These conversations shall
not be impeded by “physical barriers such as wire mesh, glazed barriers, or
other . . . obstructions . . . .”145 These visits may not be “monitored, except through
glazed observation panels or by means of closed circuit television . . . .”146 States
COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-403 (West 2018).
140. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 1068 (2018).
141. IDAHO SHERIFFS’ ASSOC., MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR DETENTION FACILITIES
ch. 14.22.01 (2014).
142. Id. ch. 14.07.
143. 81 NEB. ADMIN CODE § 9-003.1B (1980).
144. Id. § 9-003.01C.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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with detailed standards include Alaska, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawai’i, Illinois,
Louisiana, and Rhode Island.
States that have jail standards usually address the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment availability through policies governing attorney visits, mail access, and
phone calls.
a. Mail
Most states with publicly available standards offer some protections for legal
mail, most commonly some form of guarantee of its confidentiality. Most states
allow sealed mail to be sent to attorneys (and often courts and government officials
and agencies).147 Most also specify that incoming mail is to be opened in the
presence of the prisoner,148 but a few states, consistent with the conflicts in the case
law on the subject, prohibit reading of prisoners’ legal mail.149 Some also require
subsidies for indigent prisoners’ legal correspondence. Idaho, for example, specifies
that “[i]ndigent inmates are provided with writing supplies and postage for all letters
to their attorneys, the courts, government officials, officials of the confining
authority, or administrators of grievance systems.150 California provides that “those
inmates who are without funds shall be permitted . . . without limitation on the
number of postage paid envelopes and sheets of paper to his or her attorney and to
the courts.”151
147. Alaska; Arkansas; California; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Hawai’i; Idaho;
Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michigan; Minnesota;
Missouri; Nebraska; New Jersey; New York; Ohio; Oklahoma; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; Tennessee;
Texas; Vermont; Virginia; West Virginia; and Wisconsin.
148. Alaska; Arkansas; California; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Hawai’i; Idaho;
Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Louisiana; Maine; Massachusetts; Minnesota; Missouri; Nebraska; New Jersey;
New York; Ohio; Oklahoma; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; South Carolina; Tennessee; Texas; Vermont;
Virginia; and West Virginia.
149. See, e.g., Alaska (“Incoming mail to a prisoner that is clearly marked as coming from an
individual or organization listed in this subsection is privileged and may only be opened in the presence
of the prisoner, and only to search for contraband. . . . Outgoing privileged mail may not be searched
for contraband nor read for content . . . .”); Florida (“Privileged mail includes mail from attorneys,
courts, and public officials. If incoming privileged mail is opened to determine that it is privileged mail
and contains no contraband, it must be done in the presence of the inmate. Only the signature and
letterhead may be read.”); Georgia (“When inspecting privileged mail, the deputy is to ‘thumb’ through
and separate the pages to ensure contraband has not been concealed. Facility staff shall not read or
censor privileged mail.”).
150. IDAHO SHERIFFS’ ASSOC., supra note 141, ch. 14.08.
151. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 1063 (2018); see also CONN. DEP’T OF CORRS.,
ADMIN. DIRECTIVE NO. 10.7: INMATE COMMUNICATIONS 4.D. ( 2012), https://portal.ct.gov/-/
media/DOC/Pdf/Ad/ad1007pdf.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/QNV2-393G] (“An indigent
inmate . . . shall be permitted the following items free of charge: . . . 2. five (5) letters per month
addressed to the court or attorneys . . . . Additional free correspondence to courts and attorneys may
be authorized by the Unit Administration based upon the reasonable needs of the inmate; 3. a
writing instrument; and, 4. writing paper (no more than 20 sheets of paper to the courts or attorneys
per month. Additional sheets of paper to the courts or attorneys may be authorized by the Unit
Administrator based upon the reasonable needs of the inmate).”); DEL. DEP’T OF CORR., POL’Y OF
DEP’T OF CORR., NO. 4.0: OFFENDER MAIL (IV)(E)(3) (2016), https://doc.delaware.gov/assets/
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b. Visits
Thirty-three states have rules governing attorney visiting processes in their
jails.152 Seven states specify that visits can occur during all waking hours or outside
regular visiting hours.153 Three states provide for expanded rules during times of
documents/policies/policy_4-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R8P-4DD3] (“Procedures should be
established at each facility to provide indigent offenders with necessary mail supplies for legal/
privileged mail”); FLA. SHERIFFS ASS’N, FLORIDA MODEL JAIL STANDARDS ch. 9.3g (2017),
https://www.flsheriffs.org/uploads/docs/FMJS_Standards._01-01-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7AVW-PY6F] (“Inmates without funds will be supplied with writing materials and postage
to correspond with attorneys and the court.”); IDAHO SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR
DET. FACILITIES ch. 14.08 (2014), http://www.idahosheriffs.org/index_htm_files/Jail%20
Standards%20Manual%20February%202018%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7SK-38ZF] (“Indigent
inmates are provided with writing supplies and postage for all letters to their attorneys, the courts,
government officials, officials of the confining authority, or administrators of grievance systems.”);
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 201-50.19 (356,356A)(1)(b) (2017) (“A reasonable amount of postage shall be
provided to indigent prisoners held beyond 24 hours for communication with the courts and for at least
two letters per week of a personal nature.”); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, Pt III, § 3105(F) (2017)
(“Inmates shall be able to obtain paper, postage, forms, notarial services, technical information and
specific legal materials needed to insure their rights to court access.”); NEB. JAIL STANDARDS
BD., STANDARDS FOR COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES - MAIL, VISITING AND TELEPHONE
SERVICE ch. 8.002.07 (2012), https://ncc.nebraska.gov/sites/ncc.nebraska.gov/files/pdf/jail_
standards/jail_rules_and_reg/Title77/CHAPTER8.pdf [https://perma.cc/75PD-FWAX] (“Indigent
inmates shall receive sufficient materials and postage for a reasonable amount of correspondence to
maintain family and communities ties, and for legal or other confidential correspondence.”);
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:31-19.7(e) (2017) (“Letter-writing materials shall be provided to inmates by
staff and the facility shall assume the cost of mailing legal correspondence for indigent inmates.”); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE 5120:1-8-06(F) (2017) (“Indigent inmates shall receive writing materials, envelopes and
postage for two letters per week.”); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 310:670-5-9(1) (2017) (“The facility shall
provide postage, one (1) time per week, for prisoners who do not have funds for correspondence with
their attorney, court officials, elected officials, and next of kin.”); S.C. JAIL & PRISON INSPECTION
DIV., MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR LOCAL DETENTION FACILITIES IN SOUTH CAROLINA standard
2032 (2013), http://www.sccounties.org/Data/Sites/1/media/publications/sc-jail-standardsfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/G83Y-2LQZ] (“If an inmate is indigent, he/she shall be provided
sufficient postage, envelopes, and writing materials to write two (2) personal letters per week if he/she
wishes to do so. Like provisions apply should an indigent inmate wish to communicate with his/her
lawyer(s) and court officials.”); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1400-01-.11(6) (2017) (“Facilities shall also
provide postage for all legal or official mail.”); W. VA. CODE R. § 95-1-17 (2017) (“Indigent inmates
shall be provided, without cost, sufficient stationery and postage for all letters to attorneys, courts, and
public officials and two (2) personal letters per week.”).
152. Alaska; Arkansas; California; Connecticut; Florida; Georgia; Hawai’i; Idaho; Illinois;
Indiana; Iowa; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Minnesota; Missouri; Nebraska;
New Jersey; New York; North Carolina; North Dakota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania;
Rhode Island; South Carolina; Texas; Vermont; Virginia; and Wisconsin.
153. ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRS., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 808.01: LEGAL RIGHTS OF
PRISONERS VII.A. ( 2007), http://www.correct.state.ak.us/pnp/pdf/808.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MCZ6-6B9E] (“Attorneys and legal representatives may visit a prisoner at the institution between 8
AM and 10 PM daily or at any time during the initial 24 hours of a client’s incarceration except
at meal times or while the institution conducts a population count.”); GA. SHERIFF’S ASS’N,
MODEL JAIL POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL (2014), policy no. 519(II)(A)-(B)
(2014), https://georgiasheriffs.org/law-enforcement-portal/law-enforcement-resources/publications
[https://perma.cc/3X5Q-NK24] (“Attorneys are permitted to confidentially visit with inmates
between 0700-2300 hours. During the first 24 hours, there are to be no time restrictions . . . . Attorney
visitation may be limited only if the visit will cause an unnecessary disruption that endangers the facility
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emergency.154 Missouri is the only state to explicitly codify restrictions on visiting
rights. Its jail standards provide that: “It is constitutional to limit visitors.
Limitations, such as time, frequency, duration of visits and number of visitors, can
be placed on visitation rights.” 155
Beyond protecting access to visits, most states have rules protecting their
confidentiality although the scope and extent of the procedures to protect
confidentiality varies.156 For example, Indiana’s policy provides that: “Inmates shall
security . . . .”); IDAHO SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, supra note 141, ch. 14.22.01 (“Attorneys and clergy shall be
permitted to visit inmates at reasonable hours other than during regularly scheduled visiting hours);
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 701.200(b)(1) (2017) (“Attorneys . . . shall be permitted to visit
detainees at reasonable hours other than during regularly scheduled visiting hours or periods.”);
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, Pt III, § 3101 (2017) (“Inmates may receive visits from attorneys or attorneydelegates at any reasonable time between wake-up and lights-out.”); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:3115.4(c) (2017) (“Visits of attorneys and representatives of attorneys shall be permitted without notice,
or upon reasonable notice, during at least six hours each business day.”); R.I. DEP’T OF CORRS. POLICY
& PROCEDURE, ACCESS TO INSTITUTIONAL FACILITIES BY ATTORNEYS AND THEIR AGENTS, 13.025 DOC III.F.1 (2015), http://www.doc.ri.gov/documents/administration/policy/policies/13.02-5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GKC5-9UW8] (“Attorneys and their agents are permitted to visit incarcerated
clients between the hours of 8:30 AM and 8:30 PM every day, and at other times should special
circumstances arise.”).
154. HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CORRS. ADMIN. POLICY AND PROCEDURES, Policy
No. COR. 15.02 (2010), https://dps.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/COR.15.02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LT35-3XCE] (“Each facility shall establish contingency plans for necessary attorney
visits during the evenings or weekends where there is an emergent situation with the inmate’s case”);
81 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 9-003.01B (2017) (“However, in the event of an emergency, then attorneys
or their legal assistants shall be allowed to visit their clients at any time”); R.I. DEP’T OF CORRS. POLICY
& PROCEDURE, supra note 153, III.F.1 (“Attorneys and their agents are permitted to visit incarcerated
clients between the hours of 8:30 am and 8:30 pm every day, and at other times should special
circumstances arise. Prior approval by the warden or designee is required for access outside the hours
of 8:30 to 8:30 pm.”).
155. MO. SHERIFFS ASS’N, MISSOURI CORE JAIL STANDARDS, MCJS 6.5.6 (2017),
https://www.mosheriffs.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Section-6-Constitutional-Protections.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZB86-BJ5K].
156. ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRS., supra note 153, VII.A. (“(1) The institution shall ensure that
the attorney or attorney’s representative can speak privately with the prisoner and exchange or review
legal documents without interference from correctional staff, except for a search for contraband. (2)
The institution may not monitor conversations between an attorney or the attorney’s representative and
a prisoner except upon court order.”); ARK. CRIMINAL DET. FACILITIES REVIEW COMM., CRIMINAL
DET. FACILITY STANDARDS 2014, Section 6-1002(B) (2014), https://www.dfa.arkansas.gov/images/
uploads/criminalDetentionOffice/proposedjailStandards.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P3J-RKH6] (“Legal
consultation(s) shall be permitted in private, shall be unmonitored, and occur at the place of detention
on a reasonable basis.”); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 1068 (2017) (referring to “confidential consultation
with attorneys”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-403 (West 2017) (“Any person committed,
imprisoned, or arrested for any cause, whether or not such person is charged with an offense, shall be
allowed to consult with an attorney-at-law of this state whom such person desires to see or consult,
alone and in private, at the place of custody . . . .”); FLA. STAT. § 901.24 (2016) (“A person arrested
shall be allowed to consult with any attorney entitled to practice in this state, alone and in private at the
place of custody . . . .”); GA. SHERIFF’S ASS’N, supra note 153, policy no. 519(II)(A) (“Attorneys are
permitted to confidentially visit with inmates between 0700-2300 hours”); HAW. DEP’T OF
PUB. SAFETY, CORRS. ADMIN. POLICY AND PROCEDURES, Policy No. COR. 12.02, 4.0.11.b.3 (2009),
https://dps.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/COR.12.02.pdf [https://perma.cc/U86GUQTW] (stating that visits “shall be in an area where the attorney client privilege can be honored, but
that staff may keep visual contact without monitoring the conversation”); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 §
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have confidential access to their attorneys and the authorized representatives of
their attorneys,”157 while Nebraska has a detailed policy governing the kind of space
in which attorney-client meetings should take place and the ways in which they may
701.200(b)(2) (2017) (“An area for interview between a detainee and his or her attorney . . . shall be
provided and arranged so as to ensure privacy.”); 210 IND. ADMIN. CODE 3-1-15(a) (2017) (“Inmates
shall have confidential access to their attorneys and the authorized representatives of their attorneys.”);
501 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 3:140 (Sect.1)(4)(a)(1)-(2) (2017) (“The jailer, jail administrator, or jail personnel
shall ensure the right of a prisoner to have confidential access to his attorney or authorized
representative. (a) To the extent available in the jail and reasonable use by an attorney, ‘confidential
access’ shall include a meeting with counsel in a private room in the jail . . . (1) Jail employees and other
prisoners shall not enter the room during the attorney-client meeting, unless an emergency or the
security of the jail requires. (2) The room should be located so that conversations in ordinary tones with
the door closed cannot be overheard by others outside the room . . . .”); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, Pt
III, § 3101(B) (2017) (“Inmate communications, with attorneys by telephone or personal visit shall
be entirely confidential.”); ME. DEP’T OF CORRS., DET. AND CORR. STANDARDS FOR
ME. COUNTIES AND MUNICIPALITIES, J.17. (2017), http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/rules/03/201/
201c001.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L6F-MCYM] (“Visits and access to attorneys and their attorneys’
authorized representatives should be provided during normal business hours.”); MD. CODE
REGS. 12.14.03.06(C)(4) (2018) (“The managing official shall have written policy and procedure
regarding inmate legal matters, which include provisions for . . . (4) Confidential visits with legal counsel
and their authorized representatives”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.10 (West 2017) (“All officers or
persons having in their custody a person restrained of liberty, except in cases where imminent danger
of escape or injury exists, shall admit any attorney retained by or on behalf of the person restrained, or
whom the restrained person may desire to consult, to a private interview at the place of custody . . . .”);
81 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 9-003.01C (2017) (“Contact visits between inmates and their attorneys or the
attorneys’ legal assistants shall be in a private area or room so as to allow for confidential
communication among up to four (4) people with adequate writing space. No physical barriers such as
wire mesh, glazed barriers, or other physical obstructions shall be placed between inmates and visitors.
Such visits shall not be monitored, except through glazed observation panels or by means of closed
circuit television as necessary.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10A:31-3.14(c) (West 2017) (stating that “[a]ll
facilities shall include interview areas which provide for confidential consultation with attorneys,” and
that “suitable meeting facilities shall be provided for inmates to meet with attorneys and representatives
of attorneys in privacy with reasonable comfort”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7031.2 (2018)
(“Visits between prisoners and their legal counsel shall not be monitored except visually.”); 10A
N.C. ADMIN. CODE 14J.1208(d)(3), (5), (6) (2016) (“Confidential attorney visitation areas shall: . . . (3)
provide seating and a writing table for the inmate and attorney; . . . (5) provide a way for the attorney
to contact officers if needed; and (6) provide a minimum of 30 foot-candles of artificial light.”);
N.D. DEP’T OF CORRS. & REHAB., NORTH DAKOTA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY STANDARDS,
standard 85 (2017) https://docr.nd.gov/sites/www/files/documents/jails/North%20Dakota%20
Correctional%20Facility%20Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY77-LKP9] (“Visits by legal counsel
may be subject to staff or video observation, but without audio-monitoring. Audio or video recording
of attorney visits is prohibited.”); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120:1-8-06(H) (2018) (“Inmates shall have
access to legal counsel of record including telephone contact, written communication, and confidential
visits.”); 37 PA. CODE § 95.233(5) (2017) (“Written local policy must require that accommodations be
made to provide for the privacy of conversation during these visits.”); S.C. JAIL & PRISON INSPECTION
DIV., supra note 151, standard 2034(a) (“Each facility shall establish policies and procedures to ensure
the right of inmates to have access to legal counsel, courts, and legal materials. Such policies and
procedures shall include at least the following: (1) The right of an inmate to communicate with legal
counsel without censorship or monitoring . . . .”); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1400-01-.12(8) (2018)
(“Inmates shall have unrestricted and confidential access to the courts.”); 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE 15-40600 (2018) (“Written policy and procedures shall ensure that attorneys are permitted to have
confidential visits with detainees.”); W. VA. CODE R. § 95-1-17 (2017) (“Visitation facilities shall be
private and confidential with no monitoring of conversations.”).
157. 210 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 3-1-15(a).
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be monitored.158 North Dakota allows visits to be subject to video or visual
observation, but not audio-monitoring.159
Only a few states explicitly mandate that visits should be “contact,” which
facilitates conversation and the sharing of documents, as well as the development
of a relationship between client and counsel.160 At least two federal courts have held
that the state must offer a rationale for failing to allow a prisoner to have a contact
visits with attorneys,161 but it’s not clear whether the inadequate space or staffing
conditions in many jails would suffice as a justification.
c. Phone Calls
Twenty-one states have standards providing for (or assuming the practice of)
attorney-client phone calls.162 Some additional states require facility administrators
to create phone policies, although without specific reference to attorney-client
calls.163 Fewer have rules governing the regularity and duration of these calls,164 and
most of those that do offer only access that is “reasonable.”165 For example, Idaho’s
policy provides only that “[c]alls to attorneys shall be of reasonable duration.”166
The protection in detailed-standards states also show considerable variation,
and are both enabling and limiting. Connecticut allows prisoners to initiate two calls
a month, in addition to those received from the attorney.167 The policy further
provides that calls “answered by a busy signal shall not be counted,” but “those
158. See 81 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 9,003.01B (2017) (“Contact visits between inmates and their
attorneys or the attorneys’ legal assistants shall be in a private area or room so as to allow for
confidential communication among up to four (4) people with adequate writing space. No physical
barriers such as wire mesh, glazed barriers, or other physical obstructions shall be placed between
inmates and visitors. Such visits shall not be monitored, except through glazed observation panels or
by means of closed circuit television as necessary.”).
159. See N.D. DEP’T OF CORRS. & REHAB., supra note 156.
160. Alaska; Kentucky; Nebraska; North Carolina; Vermont; and West Virginia.
161. See Mann v. Reynolds, 46 F.3d 1055, 1060–61 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Ching v. Lewis, 895
F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1990). In both cases, the courts found that the presumptive right to contact
visits was protected as part of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of access to courts.
162. Alaska; Connecticut; Delaware; Georgia; Hawai’i; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Kentucky;
Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Minnesota; Nebraska; New Jersey; New York; North Dakota; Ohio;
Rhode Island; Texas; and Vermont.
163. See, e.g., Arkansas; California; Florida; Missouri; Pennsylvania; and West Virginia.
164. Connecticut; Hawai’i; Idaho; Illinois; and Maine. South Carolina’s policy does not create
an affirmative requirement but states that “restrictions on making telephone calls should not be
imposed unless such privileges have been suspended and/or restricted based on legitimate government
interests related to the safe and secure operation of the facility; to prevent continued criminal activities;
or other similar concerns.” S.C. JAIL & PRISON INSPECTION DIV., supra note 151, standard 2033.
165. Georgia; Idaho; Nebraska; Texas; and West Virginia. Tennessee requires that: “The
facility shall establish reasonable hours during which attorneys may visit and/or telephonically
communicate.” TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1400-01-.12(8) (2018). Vermont provides that lines should
be available to receive privileged calls on a “regular basis.” VT. DEP’T OF CORR., APA RULE #13-043,
DOC Policy#325 (2013), http://www.doc.state.vt.us/about/policies/rpd/rules/325-telephone-use
[https://perma.cc/P8VV-CYEX].
166. IDAHO SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, supra note 151, ch. 14.13.01.
167. CONN. DEP’T OF CORRS., supra note 151, 5.F.
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answered by a person or machine” do.168 In addition, the standards provide that
“[a]n inmate’s request for a call to an attorney shall be honored either by the close
of the first business day following the day on which the request was received or on
the day specified by the inmate, whichever shall occur later.”169 Hawai’i, by contrast,
requires prisoners to request permission in writing to use the phone and to provide
an explanation of “the need to communicate by phone in lieu of using other means
of court access such as personal visits by their attorney, communication by mail, or
use of the law library for research.”170 If permission is granted, Hawai’i’s policy
further provides that legal calls should be limited to no more than three calls per
week, with each call limited to ten minutes.”171
Notably, few states specifically protect attorney phone access for prisoners
who have been assessed as posing a security threat or are being disciplined. Alaska
provides that, “[p]risoners whose telephone access has been limited or suspended
must still be allowed telephone calls to an attorney . . . .”172 Idaho also explicitly
prevents attorney calls from being revoked for disciplinary infractions.173 Finally,
only thirteen states have rules protecting the confidentiality of attorney-client phone
calls.174
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. HAW. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 156.
171. Id.
172. ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRS., supra note 153, VII.A.1.d.
173. See IDAHO SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, supra note 151, ch. 14.08.
174. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 05.530(b) (2018) (“A prisoner’s call to an attorney may
not be monitored unless authorized by a court.”); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 18-81-46 (2018) (“Such
calls [to attorneys] shall be placed by staff who shall verify the party’s identity prior to placing the inmate
on line. The staff member shall then move out of listening range of the inmate’s conversation. The
employee placing the call may maintain visual observation of the inmate.”); DEL. DEP’T OF
CORR., POL’Y OF DEP’T OF CORR., No. 3.17 (V)(I) ( 2015), https://doc.delaware.gov/assets/
documents/policies/policy_3-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE3G-ZZVK] (“All Offender calls may
be monitored and recorded for security purposes with the following exceptions: 1. Legal calls . . . .”);
GA. SHERIFF’S ASS’N, supra note 153, policy no. 5.18(II)(F) (“Inmates calling their attorney or
probation/parole officers are to notify the Shift Supervisor to ensure the call is not monitored and the
confidentiality of the conversation is maintained.”); IDAHO SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, supra note 151,
ch. 14.13.02 (“Calls to attorneys shall not be monitored.”); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 701.190 (2017)
(“Telephone calls may be monitored unless prior special arrangements have been made to make or
receive confidential telephone calls to or from the detainee’s attorney.”); 210 IND. ADMIN. CODE 3-116(l) (2017) (“Conversations between an inmate and his or her legal representative may not be
monitored or recorded without a court order.”); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, Pt III, § 3101(B) (2017)
(“Inmate communications, with attorneys by telephone or personal visit shall be entirely confidential.”);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.10 (West 2017) (“[A]ll officers or persons having in their custody a person
restrained of liberty whether or not the person restrained has been charged, tried, or convicted, shall
provide private telephone access to any attorney retained by or on behalf of the person restrained.”);
81 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 9-004.03 (2017) (“Telephone calls to or from legal counsel shall not be
monitored.”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7031.2(b) (2017) (“Telephone communications
between prisoners and their legal counsel shall not be monitored except visually.”); N.D. DEP’T OF
CORRS. & REHAB., supra note 156, standard 84 (“These calls may not be audio monitored or
recorded.”); R.I. DEP’T OF CORRS. POLICY & PROCEDURE, ACCESS TO INSTITUTIONAL FACILITIES
BY ATTORNEYS AND THEIR AGENTS, 24.02-4 DOC II.C.3.f. (2010) (“Calls that will not be recorded attorney calls.”); VT. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 165, at 6.A. (“Inmate telephone conversations, with
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3. The Limits and Possibilities of Standards
As this survey illustrates, protections for the Sixth Amendment rights of
prisoners are unevenly codified in state jail standards around the country. In a
handful of states, like Nebraska and Connecticut, the policies governing counsel
access are specific, designed not only to codify well-established constitutional rights,
but to anticipate and resolve challenges that might impact successful representation.
In many other states, however, the standards are general or nonexistent. And, of
course, the formal existence of these standards may have little or no relationship
with actual practice on the ground. The difficulty of locating the applicable rules in
many states might also indicate that, in some jurisdictions, they are not widely
understood or followed. Nonetheless, in many states, they represent an important
frame of reference for evaluating and challenging practices on the ground.
The standards review processes, which occur on a regular basis in some states,
as well as the inspections that some states conduct as part of their enforcement
efforts or invite while seeking accreditation, offer further opportunities to reinforce
and shift these norms. Drawing attention to variations in state policies has, in some
documented instances, led to state efforts to eliminate problematic, outlier policies
or to adopt better ones.175 Moreover, the limited available research suggests that jail
standards can be helpful in improving jail conditions.176
The adoption of new model standards also presents the opportunity to
highlight the challenges of counsel access in jails and prisons and to encourage the
adoption of more detailed protections. The Core Jail Standards (Core Standards) of
the American Correctional Association (ACA), adopted in 2010, were intended to
set a basic floor achievable for jails of all sizes.177 The Core Standards provide that
“[i]nmate access to counsel is ensured. Such contact includes, but is not limited to,
the exception of privileged communications, shall be recorded and may be monitored.”); W. VA. CODE
R. § 95-1-17 (2017) (“Telephone calls shall not be monitored unless authorized by a prior court order.”).
175. For example, the Liman Program at Yale conducted a 50-state survey of visiting rules, in
collaboration with the Association of State Correctional Administrators. Following the collection of
the data, Washington State removed its requirement that noncitizen visitors provide proof of legal
visits. Utah eliminated its unique provision mandating that only English be spoken during prison visits.
See Chesa Boudin et al., Prison Visitation Policies: A Fifty-State Survey, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149,
174 (2013).
176. Thompson & Mays, supra note 127 (finding that mandatory standards were associated with
improved programs and operating procedures in the jails). Somewhat surprisingly, despite the
prevalence and popularity of standards, we were unable to locate much in the way of empirical research
supporting their efficacy.
177. The ACA has been drafting professional correctional standards for over 70 years. See
The History of Standards and Accreditation, ACA, https://www.aca.org/ACA_Prod_IMIS/ACA_
Member/Standards___Accreditation/About_Us/ACA_Member/Standards_and_Accreditation/SAC_
AboutUs.aspx?hkey=bdf577fe-be9e-4c22-aa60-dc30dfa3adcb [https://web.archive.org/web/
20180130180337/https://www.aca.org/ACA_Prod_IMIS/ACA_Member/Standards___Accreditation/
About_Us/ACA_Member/Standards_and_Accreditation/SAC_AboutUs.aspx?hkey=bdf577fe-be9e4c22-aa60-dc30dfa3adcb] (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). The standards for Adult Local Detention
Facilities are in their fourth edition; however, as of 2009, only 130 jails had been accredited under these
standards. See Scott Strait & Tim Ahlborn, New “Core Jail Standards” Provide Sheriffs and Jail Managers
with Much-Needed Guidance, 71 CORRECTIONS TODAY 60 (2009).
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telephone communications, uncensored correspondence, and visits.”178 The hope
is that offering certification in the Core Standards will create an achievable starting
point for jail reform.179 In addition, the 2011 American Bar Associations Standards
for Criminal Justice on the Treatment of Prisoners (ABA Standards) include
several provisions on access to legal counsel that would expand upon and clarify
those found in most current state standards. The ABA Standards explain that:
“Correctional authorities should facilitate prisoners’ access to counsel.”180 In
addition to the type of protections already present in some states’ current rules, the
ABA Standards require prisoners with a pending criminal charge to be placed
“sufficiently near the courthouse where the case will be heard that the preparation
of the prisoner’s defense is not unreasonably impaired.”181 They confirm that
attorney-client meetings should be contact, absent “an individualized finding that
security requires otherwise” and that counsel and clients should be able to share
“previously searched documents without intermediate handling of those papers by
correctional authorities.”182 The ABA standards clarify that counsel visits and phone
calls should not count toward a prisoner’s limited personal visit and telephone time,
nor should counsel access be contingent on a prisoner’s level of programming or
privileges, unless the “prisoner has engaged in misconduct directly related to such
visits or communications,” and even then, counsel visits should only be “reasonably
restrict[ed], but not eliminate[d].”183 These national standards undergo regular
review and update processes.184 Such a review might provide a starting point for
identifying other ways to facilitate access to counsel despite limited resources.
Given the current state of the case law, jail administrators in most jurisdictions
lack clear guidance as to their responsibilities to incarcerated pretrial defendants and
others in their facilities who may also have valid Sixth Amendment claims.185
Nonetheless, this survey suggests some basic principles for reform.
First, jail standards should offer specific guidance on how to implement
counsel access policies to protect against inadvertent constitutional violations. For
example, Georgia’s model standards provide that “[w]hen inspecting privileged
mail, the deputy is to ‘thumb’ through and separate the pages to ensure contraband

178. AM. CORR. ASS’N, CORE JAIL STANDARDS § 1-Core-6A-02 (2010),
http://corrections.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Core-Jail-Standards-as-printed-June2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY9W-3KCW].
179. See Strait & Ahlborn, supra note 177.
180. AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS § 239.4 (a) (3d ed. 2011).
181. Id. § 23-9.4 (b).
182. Id. § 23-9.4(c)(ii)(A, D).
183. Id. § 23-3.7(d) (restrictions relating to programming and privileges).
184. See The History of Standards and Accreditation, supra note 177 (describing the revision
process).
185. Increasingly, jail facilities do not house only or all pretrial detainees, which further
complicates the task of ensuring that the Sixth Amendment’s protections are respected for all those
who are entitled to them.
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has not been concealed. Facility staff shall not read or censor privileged mail.”186
This kind of specific directive both communicates the purpose of the policy and
gives line officers with clear operational guidance. By contrast, some states indicate
that privileged mail must be opened in the presence of the prisoner, but do not
explain that this practice is designed to protect the confidentiality of prisoner
mail.187 Similarly, many state standards provide for attorney visits, but offer limited
guidance for structuring them. A particularly important omission is the failure to
specify that such visits must be contact,188 even though at least two federal courts
have held that contact visits are constitutionally required absent special
circumstances.189
In addition, standards should address potential challenges of implementation.
Most states’ standards do not indicate how deviations in routine should be
addressed, yet failure to allow counsel access in the event of an emergency can raise
constitutional concerns. Three states do specifically allow additional attorney
visiting hours in special circumstances, but interestingly, none specify whether
additional phone access should be permitted in these situations, even though phone
calls might be easier to facilitate.190 Jail standards should also address attorney access
for detainees who present a security risk or who are being disciplined. Providing
attorney access for detainees in administrative or disciplinary segregation can raise
additional logistical and legal challenges.191 Only a few states, however, protect
attorney phone access for these prisoners, and only one state, Idaho, explicitly
prohibits access to attorney calls from being revoked as a disciplinary measure. More
explicit policies would make it easier for jail administrators and line officers to fulfill
their constitutional obligations even in extraordinary situations.
Standards should also specify when subsidies are required for detainees who
are indigent. Mail continues to be a significant method of attorney-client
communication, yet not all detainees have the financial means to purchase the
necessary materials. Failure to subsidize mail could, depending on the availability of
other means of communication, raise constitutional concerns. Therefore, some
states explicitly provide for a certain amount of subsidized mail per month for
indigent prisoners.
Finally, jail standards should more directly address access to technology. At
present, the standards lack even consistent protection for telephone access, despite
the time and costs savings that could potentially accrue to the criminal justice system

186. GA. SHERIFF’S ASS’N, supra note 153, policy no. 5.16(2)(F).
187. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
188. See Strait & Ahlborn, supra note 177.
189. See Boudin et al., supra note 175.
190. See IDAHO SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, supra note 151.
191. See, e.g., U.S. v. Martinez-Hernandez, 2015 WL 6133050 (D.P.R. Oct. 15, 2015) (alleging
violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel based on defendants’ place in administrative
segregation).
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by allowing more regular phone access.192 Alaska appears to be alone among the
states in mandating that prisoners must be allowed to receive legal faxes from their
attorneys, limited to two pages.193 The federal corrections system currently has
email,194 but prisoners must consent to monitoring before they are allowed to use
it, even to communicate with their lawyers.195 Similarly, Ohio’s regulations state that
if a jail provides email service to prisoners, “the incoming and outgoing emails shall
be subject to review for security reasons.”196 As a result of these disclaimers, most
challenges to monitoring of legal email have failed on the grounds that the prisoner
is notified of the surveillance and consents, and due to the availability of other (less
efficient) forms of confidential communication.197 Drawing attention to the current
barriers to attorney-client access could create the opportunity to reconsider the
costs and benefits of preventing email and other technologies from being used for
confidential legal communications.198
B. Structural Litigation
Historically, a major driver for both the development of professional
standards and their adoption is the threat of litigation.199 Thus, litigation may be
necessary to encourage the development of more rigorous standards for protecting
Sixth Amendment rights in prison. Particularly, in the jurisdictions that have applied
Turner and Lewis to right to counsel claims, an alternative approach is needed that

192. Even in states that protect confidential calls, jails may create barriers that that unduly
restrict telephone access. For example, the New Orleans Sheriff permits lawyers to make unrecorded
phone calls to their clients from specified landlines; however, it records and shares with the Orleans
Parish District Attorney all calls made to cellphones. See Richard A. Oppel Jr., Calling Your Lawyer’s
Cell from Jail? What You Say Can and Will Be Used Against You, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/us/new-orleans-jail-call-lawyer.html.
193. ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRS., supra note 153; ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRS., POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES, 810.03 (2013), http://www.correct.state.ak.us/pnp/pdf/810.03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PLC-QGGM].
194. See Stay in Touch, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/
communications.jsp#email [https://perma.cc/UN5E-FSXZ] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
195. Id.
196. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120:1-8-06 (E) (2017).
197. See United States v. Walia, No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *47
(E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014); United States v. Asaro, No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014); F.T.C. v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL
171621, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012).
198. An important caveat is that in many jurisdictions where video visiting technology has been
adopted, it has become a replacement for, rather than a supplement to, in person visits, to the great
detriment of prisoners and their families. See Natasha Haverty, Video Calls Replace In-Person Visits
in Some Jails, NPR (Dec. 5, 2016, 5:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/12/05/504458311/
video-calls-replace-in-person-visits-in-some-jails [https://web.archive.org/web/20180306130621/
https://www.npr.org/2016/12/05/504458311/video-calls-replace-in-person-visits-in-some-jails].
Similarly, expanding technological access to counsel risks opening the door to other limits on counsel
access.
199. R. Morgan, Developing Prison Standards Compared, 2 PUNISHMENTS & SOC’Y 325, 339
(2000).
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foregrounds the structural nature of the challenge incarcerated defendants face in
trying to maintain productive relationships with their counsel.
To review, Lewis required a showing of actual injury for prisoners alleging
violations of their access to courts.200 The requirement has subsequently been
adopted by a number of courts considering prisoners’ right-to-counsel claims and
has proved fatal in nearly all of the resulting cases. A similar requirement, imposed
by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, has resulted in similar outcomes
for defendants who try to challenge their convictions on the basis that their counsel
was ineffective. Under the Strickland standard, to prevail on a claim of ineffective
counsel, a defendant must prove that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, given
prevailing norms of practice and that (2) counsel’s performance prejudiced the
defense such that there is reason to doubt the outcome of the trial.201 Both
Strickland and Lewis mean that the success of the defendant’s claim is based on
constructing an alternative reality, in which different lawyering conditions and
decisions would have resulted in a different outcome. Courts have, for the most
part, been very reluctant to credit these claims, whether the cause of the lawyer’s
ineffective performance is personal or structural.202
Recognizing that Strickland presents a nearly insurmountable barrier to
addressing structural deficiencies in the public defender system, challenges have
been brought in some jurisdictions based on a theory of “constructive denial” of
right to counsel based on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Cronic.203
Decided the same day as Strickland, Cronic offers a limited exception to Strickland’s
prejudice requirement.204 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens explained that the
right to counsel must protect the criminal process as a “confrontation between
adversaries” and not “a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators.”205 At a
minimum, defense representation must “require the prosecution’s case to survive
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.”206 If the defense “entirely fails to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been
a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the . . . process itself presumptively
unreliable” and no showing of prejudice is required.207

200. See Lewis v. Cook Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 6 Fed. Appx. 428 (7th Cir. 2001).
201. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).
202. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 686–87 (2007) (distinguishing personal and
structural forms of ineffective assistance).
203. See United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006); Crutchfield
v. Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1103, 1108 (11th Cir. 1986).
204. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
205. Id. at 657 (quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th
Cir. 1975)).
206. Id. at 656.
207. Id. at 659.
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For decades, Cronic went relatively unexamined.208 Then, in 2008, the New
York Civil Liberties Union brought a lawsuit on behalf of twenty poor defendants,
arguing that New York state’s failure to adequately fund local public defender
offices in five counties violated their Sixth Amendment rights.209 Specifically, the
lawsuit in Hurrell-Haring v. New York alleged that “the system-wise failure to use
expert witnesses to test the prosecution’s case and support possible defenses;
complete breakdowns in attorney-client communication; and a lack of any
meaningful advocacy on behalf of clients.”210 The Department of Justice filed a
statement of interest in the case to argue that constructive denial of the right to
counsel can occur when:
(1) on a systemic basis, counsel for indigent defendants face severe
structural limitations, such as a lack of resources, high workloads, and
understaffing of public defender offices; and/or (2) indigent defenders are
unable to or are significantly compromised in their ability to provide the
traditional markers of representation for their clients, such as time and
confidential consultation, appropriate investigation, and meaningful
adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case.211
In other words, the constructive denial cases rely on the logic of Cronic; when
structural barriers to representation are so high that the defendant is effectively
deprived of counsel, the criminal process is no longer a “confrontation between
adversaries,” and Strickland does not apply.212
Hurrell-Harring settled in 2014. Pursuant to the settlement, New York agreed
to fully fund and staff its indigent defense offices in the defendant counties.213 The
settlement provides that every indigent defendant shall have a lawyer for his or her
first court appearance and mandates that New York shall hire enough lawyers,
investigators, and supporting staff to ensure that every lawyer has the capacity to
vigorously represent their clients.214
Hurrell-Harring has been part of a recent wave of structural litigation
challenging funding deficits around the country. In Pennsylvania, a class action suit
alleged that funding deficiencies in the country resulted in the constructive denial
of counsel to indigent criminal defendants.215 The DOJ filed an amicus brief in the

208. David Carroll, Executive Director of the Sixth Amendment Center, speculates that “it
might not have been on attorneys’ radars because the criminal defendant in Cronic lost his ineffective
assistance claim.” Lorelei Laird, The Gideon Revolution, 103 ABA J. 44, 47 (2017).
209. See Amended Complaint, Hurrell-Harring et al. v. New York, No. 8866-07
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PD-NY-00020002.pdf [https://perma.cc/STA7-NZHH].
210. See Plaintiffs’ Mem. of Law in Opposition to the State Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 41, Hurrell-Harring et al., No. 8866-07.
211. Statement of Interest of the United States at 7, Hurrell-Harring et al., No. 8866-07.
212. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657.
213. Stipulation and Order of Settlement at 5–9, Hurrell-Harring et al., No. 8866-07. These
conditions were subsequently extended to all New York counties.
214. Id. at 5, 8.
215. See Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2016).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court urging the court to find that “indigent criminal
defendants who are assigned counsel in name only may vindicate their Sixth
Amendment right through a constructive denial-of-counsel claim for prospective
injunctive relief . . . .”216 In September 2016, the court agreed.217 Similarly, in 2017,
in Tucker v. State of Idaho, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the district court
had erred in analyzing each plaintiff’s case separately under Strickland.218 The court
explained that the “issues raised in this case”—”systemic, statewide deficiencies
plaguing Idaho’s public defense system”—”do not implicate Strickland.”219 Rather,
the court continued, “[a] criminal defendant who is entitled to counsel, but goes
unrepresented at a critical stage of prosecution, suffers an actual denial of counsel
and is entitled to a presumption of prejudice.”220
While a Cronic jurisprudence of structural reform is only beginning to be
developed (and may fare less well without active support from the DOJ), its
framework for alleging a constructive denial could be adapted to challenge the
conditions of lawyering in jails and prisons. Following Cronic and its recent progeny,
the argument would be that structural deficiencies within a jail or prison can result
in the constructive denial of the right to counsel for the prisoners within their walls.
In other words, having a lawyer that a prisoner cannot access as a result of the state’s
restrictions is the constitutional equivalent of not having one at all.
A lawsuit brought on behalf of the Orleans Public Defender (OPD) in 2012
offers an example of how to raise this type of global access challenge. OPD’s lawsuit
argued that the conditions under which its attorneys were required to interact with
their clients violated the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as
provisions of the Louisiana Constitution and the Louisiana regulations governing
jail standards.221
According to the pleadings in the case, the prison facilities in Orleans Parish
lacked sufficient and available space for confidential meetings.222 In some facilities,
attorneys and clients were forced to speak loudly through plexiglass walls in rooms
that are not sound-proofed, so their conversations could easily be overhead by other
prisoners, attorneys, and staff.223 Sometimes the visiting rooms were locked, so
attorney-client visits would happen in general visiting spaces.
Wait times for attorneys coming to visit their clients often exceeded an hour
or even two.224 Attorneys regularly were unable to meet with their clients because

216. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Kuren, 146 A.3d 715
(No. 57 MAP 2015).
217. Kuren, 146 A.3d at 718.
218. See Tucker v. State, 394 P.3d 54 (2017).
219. Id. at 62.
220. Id. at 63 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658–60 (1984)).
221. Motion for Preliminary Injunction, OPD v. Gusman, No. 2011-10638 (La. Mar. 2012).
222. Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Injunction & Writ of Mandamus, Gusman, No. 201110638 (Oct. 4, 2011).
223. Id.
224. Id.
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they had to leave for court, or because visiting hours would end before the client
was brought to the meeting.225 Visiting hours were limited—and sometimes not
honored—so attorneys regularly would arrive at the jails during scheduled hours
only to be arbitrarily turned out.226
The facilities also lacked places for contact visits and offered no mechanisms
(like pass-through slots) for attorneys to share and review documents with their
clients.227 Therefore, attorneys were required to turn these documents over to
prison staff to share with the prisoners.228 In addition to compromising their
confidentiality, these documents were often never delivered to their clients.229
The New Orleans lawsuit led to a stipulated preliminary injunction, so it is
unclear how this kind of case will fare if ultimately tested in litigation.230
Nonetheless, this kind of framing (which presents a full picture of the conditions of
lawyering in a facility) could have clear advantages, particularly in jurisdictions that
have adopted the requirement that Sixth Amendment claimants demonstrate injury
resulting from state interference in their relationships with counsel. Adopting a
structural approach would allow for a more comprehensive exploration of the
challenges of access at a particular facility or set of facilities, and a more accurate
framing of the issues at stake in the case. In addition, it could help courts to address
the constitutional problem, without requiring them to issue holdings
constitutionalizing particular forms of access.
Finally, invoking Gideon in the framing of these cases may carry some power
to help restructure the terms of this debate. Even as the Court has gradually
withdrawn from its commitment to ensuring meaningful court access for prisoners,
the persuasive power of Gideon is in some ways undiminished. As Hope Metcalf and
Judith Resnik have observed: “although famously (and scandalously) underfunded,
Gideon as an ideal is rarely challenged.”231 They credit the power of Gideon, “the call
for disciplined and accountable government action that stood in opposition to the
unfettered intrusions that ‘despotic’ regimes visited on people under their control,”
with structuring the litigation and the policy debates that ultimately extended court
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. The New Orleans lawsuit was also brought on behalf of OPD rather than its clients, a
model which has been employed in other jurisdictions. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters,
370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (seeking a writ of prohibition to challenge the continued
appointment of clients to the severely overworked public defender). To date, however, successful Cronic
litigation has been brought on behalf of indigent criminal defendants.
231. Gideon at Guantánamo, supra note 10, at 2510. This is not to say that there have been no
criticisms of Gideon. While the bulk of the discussion of Gideon has centered on its perpetual
underfunding, some observers have also argued that defense counsel cannot be successful “for
structural reasons . . . because the very nature of plea bargaining or sentencing prevents it.” Alexandra
Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1067 (2013). In addition, the “accuracy
movement” focuses not on counsel, but on reform of process and its enabling science and technology.
Id. at 1069.
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access to the post-9/11 detainees at Guantanamo.232 Therefore, when these access
cases are structural, framing them in terms of the fundamental right to assistance of
counsel, rather than about the right to mail or to phone access, or to increased
visiting hours, it helps to tie these cases to a powerful legacy, potentially reshaping
how they are understood by the courts and the public.
III. THE DECARCERAL PROMISE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Building more robust regulatory protections and challenging unfulfilled
constitutional commitments will help draw attention to the erosion of Sixth
Amendment protections for prisoners. But these guarantees will be impossible to
fulfill in facilities that are chronically under-resourced or operating well over
capacity. The ultimate goal of exposing the constitutional problems with counsel
access should not be to direct more resources into building renovations or jail
staffing, but rather to decrease the number of people whose relationships with
counsel are controlled by the state. Structural challenges to Sixth Amendment
violations in jail should be used to bolster the growing movement to reduce
overreliance on pretrial detention.
Over the last fifteen years, “[d]etention of the legally innocent has been
consistently driving jail growth,”233 leading to a renewed interest in bail reform.234
Prompted by a wealth of new research highlighting the financial and social costs of
pretrial detention,235 a number of states have adopted legislation to eliminate or
reform the use money bail.236 In addition, there has been a flood of successful

232. See Gideon at Guantánamo, supra note 10, at 2510.
233. RABUY & KOPF, supra note 25; see also RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF
JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 7–9 (2015) (describing
the growth in jail operations over the last thirty years, even as national crime rates have fallen).
234. See Wiseman, supra note 118, at 1352 (“Since the founding of this country, judges have
required individuals to post some form of collateral in order to incentivize them to appear at a trial that
they strongly wish to avoid–a process that could ultimately lead to their conviction and imprisonment.”)
(citation omitted). This is by no means the first attempt to reform our bail system. See KRISTEN
BECHTEL ET AL, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., DISPELLING THE MYTHS: WHAT POLICY MAKERS NEED
TO KNOW ABOUT PRETRIAL RESEARCh 2 n.1 (2012) (describing a first wave of reform efforts
beginning in the 1960s, a second beginning in the 1980s, and a third, starting in 2000).
235. Over the last few years, a wealth of new research has illustrated that money bail is
unnecessary, ineffective, and destructive. A 2017 report by the Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI) found that
pretrial detention costs the country thirty-eight million dollars a day, or fourteen billion dollars annually.
HOW MUCH DOES IT COST?, supra note 23, at 2. According to PJI, most of this money pays “to
detain people who are mostly low risk, including many whose charges will ultimately be dropped.”
Id. The experience in Washington D.C., where in 2016 ninety percent of those arrested were released
without bond, validates this conclusion. “[O]f those released, 88 percent made every court date and
most were not rearrested.” Nissa Rhee, Has Bail Reform in America Finally Reached a Tipping Point?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 3, 2017, https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2017/
0403/Has-bail-reform-in-America-finally-reached-a-tipping-point [https://web.archive.org/web/
20171206141515/https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2017/0403/Has-bail-reform-in-Americafinally-reached-a-tipping-point].
236. See generally PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE
HAPPENING (2018), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?
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litigation in jurisdictions around the country challenging the use of bail to keep
poor people in jail pending trial.237 Despite these initial signs of progress,
however, reducing the pretrial detention population will continue to be a struggle
because the source of the problem is multifaceted, including decisions made by
law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, magistrates, bail commissioners, jail
administrators, and county politicians. Further compounding the challenge are the
incentive structures that have developed to support the current system.238
In the short run, improved lawyer access would improve outcomes for those
clients who have representation at bail hearings. The Supreme Court has yet to
require appointed counsel for indigent defendants in bail hearings; therefore,
representation is patchy.239 Nonetheless, people who are represented are far more
likely to be released on their own recognizance or receive lower and more affordable
bail than their unrepresented counterparts. 240
Over time, challenges to state interference with the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel would draw attention to the true costs of over-detention. Specifically, this
advocacy could help to reverse the national trend towards exporting detention to
rural communities. As the Vera Institute for Justice has documented, increasing
reliance on rural jails threatens to undermine some of the progress that is being
realized in other areas of pretrial detention reform.241 While jail populations in large
DocumentFileKey=a9274937-579b-c76c-8f03-3f2417919f9c&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/
LCP8-M8BK] (cataloguing and describing efforts to improve pretrial justice).
237. Equal Justice Under Law, a Washington D.C.-based non-profit, has filed twelve challenges
in nine states since 2015. See Ending American Money Bail, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW,
https://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/money-bail-1/ [https://perma.cc/Y9EC-37N6] (last visited
Sept. 5, 2018). Seven lawsuits have successfully ended the use of money in bail in Clanton, Alabama;
Velda City, Missouri; Ann, Missouri; Moss Point, Mississippi; Dothan, Alabama; Ascension Parish,
Louisiana; and Dodge City, Kansas. Id. Equal Justice Under Law is also working with Representative
Ted Lieu (D-CA), who in 2016 introduced the No Money Bail Act, which seeks to eliminate the use of
money bail. No Money Bail Act of 2016, H.R. 4611, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/4611/text [https://perma.cc/2ZUTEVKM]. Civil Rights Corps, another D.C.-based non-profit, recently won challenges to the money bail
system in Harris County, Texas, and in New Orleans, Louisiana. In August 2018, California became the
first state to entirely eliminate the use of money bail. See Thomas Fuller, California Is the First State to
Scrap Cash Bail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/us/californiacash-bail.html.
238. JACOB KANG-BROWN & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE, OUT OF SIGHT:
THE GROWTH OF JAILS IN RURAL AMERICA (2017) (hereinafter OUT OF SIGHT) (citing Robin King
Davis, Brandon K. Applegate, Charles W. Otto, Ray Surette & Bernard J. McCarthy, Roles and
Responsibilities: Analyzing Local Leaders’ Views on Jail Crowding from a Systems Perspective, 50 CRIME
& DELINQ. 458, 460–61, 473–74 (2004)), http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/06/Out_of_sight_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6TP-CN85].
239. See Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333 (2011)
(documenting the results of a national survey of pre-trial representation).
240. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., DON’T I NEED A
LAWYER? PRETRIAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT FIRST JUDICIAL BAIL HEARING 32–
36 (2015), https://constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RTC-DINAL_3.18.15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7JW-AP29] (describing the results of several empirical studies documenting better
outcomes for represented defendants in bail hearings).
241. OUT OF SIGHT, supra note 238, at 9.
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urban areas are stabilizing or even shrinking, jail populations in rural areas are
growing.242 Vera attributes this development to the interplay between two factors:
a lack of justice system capacity to quickly process and release pretrial defendants,243
and a financial structure in which jail facilities benefit from prolonged
incarceration.244 Access to counsel litigation could provide a counterweight against
the outsourcing of detention to rural communities by forcing both the charging and
detaining authorities to factor in the costs of fulfilling Gideon’s mandate at a
distance. Potential claims could include challenges to the transfers themselves, as
well as to limits on access to other channels of communication once in-person visits
are made more challenging by the decisions of the state.245
Finally, access to counsel litigation will expose another aspect of the yawning
gap between Gideon in promise and in practice. The cruel reality is that even those
indigent defendants who receive competent appointed counsel are often obstructed
from accessing their lawyers through (likely unnecessary) detention by the state. Yet,
this second barrier to counsel access is largely unseen despite its impact on
incarcerated defendants and their lawyers. In fact, the intractable challenge of
underfunding is likely masking the much more soluble problem of counsel access,
the resolution of which would actually help to ensure the most efficient use of
limited defense resources.
In addition to their tactical value, however, the Sixth Amendment claims of
pretrial detainees could help to draw attention to the way in which federal courts
are increasingly eliding the distinctions between the charged and convicted,
242. “[B]etween 1970 and 2013, the proportion of pretrial detainees outside of major
metropolitan areas grew from 37 to 51 percent.” Id. at 11. As of 2017, the pretrial detention rate in rural
counties is higher, at 265 people per 200,000, than in urban counties, at 200 per 200,000. Id. at 12.
243. Some counties in Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma, Nevada, and Utah “rely on circuit judges
who cover multiple districts and sometimes can only convene district court a few times per month or
per year in any one area.” Id. at 19 (quoting Davis, Applegate, Otto, Surette & McCarthy, supra note
238, at 460–61, 473–74 (2004)). This can result in larger jail populations as detainees face significant
waiting time before receiving a bail determination. In addition, these counties have fewer pre-trial
services and diversion programs. Id. at 19. Without community-based partners that can help to “design
a detention alternative or fashion appropriate conditions of release,” courts may fall back on
incarceration. Id. at 20.
244. Increasingly, the market for jail beds is national. In the 1970s, more than half of
U.S. counties held no people in their jails for other authorities; by 2013, eighty-four percent “held
some people, either pretrial or sentenced, for other county jails, state prisons, or federal authorities like
the Federal Marshals, the Bureau of Prisons, or Immigration and Customs Enforcement.” Id. at
13–14. Many cash-strapped rural jurisdictions have tried to take advantage of these trends by building
out extra bed capacity for boarders, for whom they receive per diem payments. Id. at 21. “Some
counties, such as those in Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Tennessee, have come to
rely on a consistent flow of state prisoners or detained undocumented immigrants—and thus money
from the state or federal government—to sustain basic system operations, from staff salaries, to patrol
cars, to equipment.” Id.
245. For example, the incarceration of pre-trial defendants far from their attorneys might
provide the basis for a successful Sixth Amendment challenge. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
420 (1974) (finding an unjustifiable burden on the right of prisoners’ access to the courts by weighing
financial and time costs imposed on attorneys by travel to remote prisons), overruled in part on other
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
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acknowledging and constitutionalizing the reality that pretrial detention is
increasingly acting as a substitute for punishment.246 The constitutional law of
criminal procedure, with its orientation toward the accurate determination of guilt
and innocence, is increasingly at odds with the practice of criminal justice as a
mechanism of social control, predominantly tracking race and class.247 The counsel
access claims highlight this conflict, by forcing courts to consider the constitutional
rights of legally innocent people whom the state is treating identically, if not worse,
than those whose guilt has been adjudicated. Access to counsel litigation thus
represents an opportunity not only to make significant improvements in our current
system of indigent representation; it also creates a space to highlight and challenge,
both in the courts and with the public, the ways in which the procedural protections
guaranteed by the Constitution have been both nullified and legitimated by the
abuses of pretrial detention and mass incarceration.

246. See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297 (2012).
247. Issa Kohler-Hausmann has described this disparity between the “adjudicative model”
where “a finding of guilt triggers the question of how punishment should be deployed as social control”
and the “managerial model” wherein “the imperative of social control is at work largely irrespective of
guilt or innocence in any particular case.” Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass
Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 624 (2014).

